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Abstract
AN INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF
PROMELA/SPIN AS A VALIDATION TOOL FOR
ASYNCHRONOUS CONCURRENT SYSTEMS
by Mark Bezdany
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: Professor M. J. Lutz
Department ofComputer Science
Historically, the consequences of implementing faulty designs of
concurrent/distributed systems have been well known. There have many
documented occasions where the little-known and unaccounted-for situations
have caused the loss of human life and limb. This problem can be generalized,
nowadays, to systems termed as mission critical. This term has arisen because
individuals, businesses, and governments have come to depend on their correct
operation. Failures in these systems can have such an adverse impact, that they
are simply unacceptable. Although, due to the inherent complexity of these
systems, preventing such failures can prove to be a very difficult task.
PROMELA/SPIN is a validation environment that was developed to address
the issue of correctness in concurrent systems by means of formal verification.
PROMELA is a specification language used to model the systems to be
analyzed, while SPIN is a model-checking tool used to perform the analysis.
The modeling language, PROMELA, was specifically designed and intended for
specifying communications protocols. The tool, SPIN, has the ability to
perform both simulations and verifications of a given PROMELA model. It
also can perform a bit-state space analysis for maximum coverage of large
systems that would otherwise be unable to be exhaustively verified.
This document is the result of an analysis of PROMET , A/SPIN as a practical
formal verification method. Formal methods have been slow in their
development and acceptance because of both the complexity of the problems
that they have tried to solve, and the knowledge of formal methods needed to
use them practically. With these points in mind, the analysis will explore the
types and sizes of systems that can be verified with PROMELA/SPIN
effectively, and just how much knowledge of the tool and formal methods are
needed to do so.
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GLOSSARY
Abstraction. A representation that contains only pertinent detail.
Acceptance. A state with an undesirable property that occurs infinitely often.
Assertion. A correctness claim expressed as a Boolean condition that must be
satisfied.
Behavioral Specification. A claim encompassing some property that must be
checked in the system specification.
Bit-State Analysis. A frugal random validation of a model that cannot be
exhaustively verified due to the size of the state space and limited system
resources. It attempts to provide maximum coverage while using a minimum
amount of resources.
Blocked. Not executable.
Concurrency. The ability to perform multiple tasks in parallel.
Counter-Example. An explicit representation of an error in the system.
CPU. Central processing unit.
Deadlock. When all processes in a system are blocked, and the system is not
in a valid end-state.
Executable. A statement that is conditionally true.
Exhaustive Analysis. A full exploration, with or without reduction, of the
state space of a model that formally verifies some property.
Formal Specification. The description of a system using a language with a
formal semantics.
FormalVerification. A rigorous mathematical proof of the system.
Full-Duplex. Bi-directional information transfer.
GUI. Graphical user interface.
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HI. A representation for Vcc in discrete logic circuits.
Instantiation. The act of running a process.
Interleaving. Concurrency modeled on a single processor or control
mechanism. This is achieved by allowing control (statement executions) to
switch between active processes.
Logical Clock. A clock that does not keep
"real" time, however, it can be
used for the temporal ordering of events.
Livelock. Infinite loops in a system that prevent progress..
Liveness. A property that shows the absence of livelock.
LO. A representation for ground in discrete logic circuits.
LTL. Linear-Time Temporal Logic.
Model Checking. A verification process that checks properties in a given
specification by exploring its state space.
Non-Deterministic. Unknown or random.
On-the-FlyVerification. A model checking technique that attempts to prove
correctness properties while exploring the state space.
Partial-Order Reduction. Reducing the number of states to be visited by
combining independent statement executions into a single execution sequence.
Piggy-Backing. Placing acknowledgments in data packets.
Point-to-Point. Direct communication.
Process ID. A unique instantiation number for a process.
Progress-State. A state with a desirable property that occurs infinitely often.
PROMELA. Protocol Meta-Language.
RAM. Random Access Memory.
vui
Rendez-vous Communication. Synchronized communication between two
processes.
Saftey. A property that shows the absence of deadlock.
Side-Effect. An unwanted change in the state of the system.
SPIN. Simple PROMELA Interpreter.
State Space. Every possible reachable state of a system.
State Space Caching. A method of verification that uses disk storage to
overcome the state space explosion problem.
Stutter-Closed. Executing the last state of a process infinitely often to meet
the semantic requirements ofLTL for infinite sequences of states.
System Specification. An operational description of a system.
Temporal Claim. A behavioral specification that specifies some desirable or
undesirable behavior of a system.
Temporal Model Checking. A model checking technique that attempts to
prove correctness properties after exploring the state space.
Theorem Proving. Using some temporal logic, a set of axioms, and a set of
inference rule to prove properties of a given system.
Validation. The process of building confidence in a design or implementation
through testing, simulation, or verification.
Verification. A formal proof of properties of a system.
Weak-Faimess. A priority based mechanism that ensures a non-blocked
process will eventually make progress. (execute a statement).
XSPIN. A graphical-user interface for SPIN.
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C h ap t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Some Background on Formal Methods
Consequences of implementing faulty7 designs of hardware and software
systems have been well known. There are many documented occasions where
the little-known and unaccounted-for situations have caused the loss of human
life and limb. Individuals, businesses, and governments have come to depend
on the correct operation of these mission critical systems for their life and
livelihood. Failures in these systems can have such an adverse impact, that they
are simply unacceptable. Compounding the current problem of ensuring
correctness is the fact that as time progresses, the size and complexity of these
systems will inevitably increase. As one would expect, this also increases the
chance that subtle errors with possibly catastrophic effects will creep into
the final implementation.
Formal methods offer promise in managing this increasing complexity through
a number of techniques. Formal methods are mathematical methods used for
the specification and verification of systems through the use of languages and
tools. Formal specification is the process ofmodeling a system using a language
with a formal (mathematical) syntax and semantics. This can also include the
formal specification of known a priori properties of the system. While formal
specification, by itself, does not prove a design to be correct, the act of
precisely representing the system provides greater insight into its operation.
Formal specifications can represent many different aspects of the system;
traditionally, however, they take the form of behavioral representations. For
our purposes here, a specification be it formal or informal will consist of
two parts, a system specification and a behavioral specification of the system.
A system specification is a behavioral or operational description of the system. A
behavioral specification is a description of some desirable or undesirable property
to which the system specification must adhere.
Formal verification puts to use tools to formally analyze a system for desirable or
undesirable behaviors. There are two widely accepted paradigms in the realm
of formal verificationtheorem proving and model checking. Theorem prming
requires that both the system specification and the behavioral specification be
represented by logic formulae. Then, through a set of axioms and inference
rules an automated theorem prover will attempt to prove the behavioral
specification against the system specification. This method allows for the
formal verification of systems with infinite state spaces.
Model checking is the second formal verification method, and can itself be
divided into two techniques. The first approach can be termed temporal model
checking. It requires a finite state model of the system and a behavioral
specification of the system represented in a temporal logic. Once the state
space of the system is constructed, in memory or on disk, a check is performed
to ensure that the system models the specified behavior. This requires two
passes, one to construct the state space and one to the check behavior.
The other approach is termed on-the-fly verification. This requires both the
system and the behavior to be represented as finite state automaton. In one
pass, usually by a depth-first search of the state space, the behavior is checked
against the system. The distinction between the two approaches has been
blurred by the development of algorithms which convert temporal logic
formulae into finite state automaton.
Both model checkers and theorem provers have their advantages and
disadvantages. Model checkers are, by nature, completely automated, whereas
theorem provers sometimes are not. A model checker is an algorithmic
exploration of some finite state space. Given enough time and resources, it
will always produce an answer. Theorem provers reduce the problem of proof
to that of a search. It is not as simple as the model checking case, however, in
that they are not guaranteed to reach a conclusion. It is entirely possible that
the set of axioms or inference rules fall short in their ability to construct a
proof, or that the search simply continues with no upper-bound.
The greatest advantage of model checkers is, perhaps, their ability to produce
counter-examples. Theorem provers simply can not do this. A counter
example is produced as a direct result of a discovery of an error during a
verification run. Because all of the states leading to that error are known and
available, it is possible to retrace them to find the origin of the error. This
explicit representation of subtle errors can prove invaluable in understanding
how they come about so they can be avoided in the future.
The greatest disadvantage of model checkers is the necessity to contend with
the state space explosion effect. Even though they only deal with finite state
spaces, these spaces can be very large and must be explicitly represented. Both
model checking and theorem proving are computationally complex, however,
model checkers have the added demand for large amounts of storage. It
should be noted that in recent years, advances in CPU performance
(computational speed) have far surpassed advances in storage performance
(memory size and disk access time). For this reason, other methods for dealing
with state space explosion have arisen. Some of these methods are partial-
order reduction, localization of information, and state space caching [1].
What then is the intended goal of formal methods? Formal methods are not a
cure-all for the problems that exist in systems today. Their goal is simple: To
aid in the construction of more reliable systems. Advocates and opponents
have made arguments for and against their use as an integral part ot the
development process. Many of these arguments from both sides, in the face of
the facts, would not hold up under formal scrutiny. Formal methods are not
intended to replace existing methodologies, but rather to complement them.
As an integral part of the development process, they should be able to aid in
design and implementation without getting in the way.
1.1 Where PROMELA/SPIN Fits In
PROMELA/SPIN is considered to be an on-the-fly verifier: PROMELA is an
acronym for Protocol Meta-Language, and SPIN is an acronym for Simple
PROMELA Interpreter. PROMELA is the specification language used to
represent both the system specification and the behavioral specification as
finite state automaton. PROMELA is not a formal specification language,
however. It does not have a well-defined formal semantics or meaning in
fact it has no defined formal semantics. This means that the tool, SPIN, has
the final word on the meaning of the language.
SPIN is the validation tool that analyzes PROMELA models for some
specified property. I sometimes use the term validation, as opposed to
verification, to indicate that SPIN can do much more than just an exhaustive
search of the state space. Verification, as defined above, is always a formal
proof of correctness. Validation, on the other hand, can be a formal proof of
correctness, or it can be an informal method (i.e. testing or simulation) of
establishing greater confidence in the system. SPIN can operate as a simulator,
an exhaustive state space analyzer, or a bit-state space analyzer. It also has a
graphical user interface extension to make it much more user friendly.
The simulator has three modes of operation and is very useful at both
uncovering obvious bugs and at analyzing counter-examples. It can perform
random simulations that can provide a good view of the operation of the
system during the initial design phase. It can perform interactive simulations to
explore suspected problem areas of a design. And it can perform guided
simulations to uncover the cause of an error, which produced a counter
example during a verification run.
The verifier has two basic modes of operation. The first is an exhaustive state
space analysis of the system. If the size of the system being modeled and the
resources of the system performing the analysis are conducive to an exhaustive
search of the state space, then the tool will rigorously prove (or disprove) the
desired properties. If not, then a bit-state space analysis can (probably) be
performed. This allows for maximum coverage of a state space that can not be
exhaustively verified within the limits of the resources of the system
perforrning the analysis. A bit-state space analysis is not a conclusive proof of
the system, however, it still has the ability to find counter-examples.
1.2 .An Overview of This Thesis
PROMELA/SPIN was originally designed for protocol verification. Some
people believe that verification tools, like SPIN, should be very general in their
applicability, while others believe that a tool should only address a very specific
subset of verification problems. With this in mind, chapters 2 and 3 explore
the modeling language PROMELA. Chapter 2 illustrates the syntax and
operational semantics of the language. Chapter 3 then investigates how this
language can be applied to the modeling of different types of systems. It also
addresses the notion of abstraction in modeling systems with PROMELA a
very important topic when contending with the state space explosion problem.
The next two chapters, chapters 4 and 5, deal with the tool itself. In chapter 4,
the functionality of SPIN is explained and illustrated using the models
developed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 addresses the modes of the simulator and
verifier, and the graphical user interface, XSPIN, from a user's perspective.
This entails examples of simulation and verification runs, as well as
investigating added functionality in both SPIN and XSPIN. Chapter 5
addresses the theoretical foundations of the tool at an algorithmic level. It
does not attempt to establish lemmas or proofs of the underlying
formalisms this is not necessary for the evaluation. It is assumed that the
underlying formalisms are sound, and that the language and tool adhere to
them. The algorithms, however, that the tool is based on have a direct impact
on performance and system resources needed, warranting their investigation.
Chapter 6 documents an example problem from start to finisha tutorial, if
you will. The example problem will be that of the Commit Protocol [2], which
is used quite extensively in distributed databases. The final chapter contains
comments and conclusions based on the experiences with PROMELA/SPIN
in the preparation of this thesis. Further information, documentation, and the
source code pertaining to PROMELA/SPIN can be found in Gerard
Holzmann's book, [3] in the References of this thesis, or at its home page,
http: //net lib.bell -labs .com/net lib/ spin/what spin. html.
Chapter 2
PROMELA
2.0 Introduction
PROMELA, an acronym for Protocol Meta-Language, is intended to be a
modeling language, not a programming or implementation language. This
means that a system specified in PROMELA should be an abstraction of the
intended system and only encompass relevant information pertaining to
process behavior and interactions. As a result, PROMELA has no floating
point arithmetic, no elaborate abstract data types, and only a few basic types.
The compactness and simplicity of the language is indicative of its intended
ability to suppress detail. These attributes also lend to the ability of the
language to model systems at different levels of abstraction.
The syntax of PROMELA is based on the C programming language. This
makes it very easy for most people to understand and use within a very short
time. Also, the semantics of PROMELA are based on the guarded command
languages of Hoare and Dijkstra. This chapter explores PROMET .A in its
entirety by, at times, alluding to C or some other more well known
programrning language.
The most basic constructs in PROMELA programs are tokens, and there are
five different classes of them. The first class is identifiers, which are represented
by a letter, period, or underscore followed by one or more letters, periods,
underscores, or digits. This means that an identifier cannot start with a digit.
The second class is keywords, which are reserved words that represent some sort
of predefined PROMELA data type, construct, or function. The third class is
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constants, which are a sequence of one or more digits that represent an integer.
Constants can be defined in one of two ways: via mtype definitions (to be
discussed later), or with C-stylemacros.1The fourth class contains operators,
which are reserved symbols used to perform functions on variables, constants,
and channels. The final class is statement separators, represented by / (the
semicolon) or -> (the arrow). It should be emphasized that they are statement
separators and not statement terminators, however, it is not considered an
error to use them as either.
The next section discusses the structure of PROMELA models. Section 2.2
explores the syntax and semantics of the language that are directly related to
the basic elements processes, channels, and variables. After that, the syntax
and semantics of the different methods of control flow are investigated. This
is followed by a discussion of the correctness claims used in PROMELA. The
final section is comments and conclusions on the language's ability to model
systems, and some of the difficulties and pitfalls that can be encountered.
2.1 The Structure of a PROMELA Model
Models in PROMELA consist of processes, variables, and channels. Processes
are always global entities that represent the behavior of the system. Variables
and channels can be global or local entities that represent the state of the
system. Each of these will be discussed later in detail, however, they are
introduced now as a starting point to understand how a model is put together.
1 C-style macros and includes are handled by the C-preprocessor and should follow all rules pertaining to
the preprocessor being used.
8
System
globalVariable
Processl
localVariablel
channell
channel2
Process2
localVariable2
Process3
channe!3
Process4
Figure 2.1: Block diagram of a simple system.
The figure above represents a simple system modeled in PROMELA. All of
the processes shown in the figure above are global and can be seen throughout
the system. The fact that Prvcess3 and Prvcess4 are inside of Prvcess2 only means
that they are instantiated by Pwcess2, but once instantiated they are global
entities. The variable, globalVariable, and channels, channell and channel2, are all
global. Because the two channels are being used by both Prvcessl and Prvcess2,
and assuming that they were not declared within another process and then
passed in as parameters, they must be global entities also. The local variables,
locall'ariablel and locallrariabk2, were declared within Prvcessl and Prvcess2 and
are therefore local to their respective processes. The only thing left is channels
and it is assumed to have been declared in Prvcess2, making it local.
Concurrency is modeled, in the PROMELA model above, through interleaved
statement executions. The last three words in the last sentence will be an
important guide for those who wish to make useful models using PROMELA.
This is due to the nature of SPIN as a model checker, which performs
verifications by exploring the entire state space. It is necessary to keep the
state space as small as possible so that it can be fully explored. Without
keeping this in mind during the modeling process, the end result could be a
very good specification of the design that cannot be verified due to the size of
the state space. To show how this relates to inter-leaved statement executions, each
of these terms must first be defined and understood separately.
A statement in PROMELA is the most basic executable construct in the
language. They are atomic, meaning that if a statement starts execution, it can
not be preempted or blocked and must run to its completion. As an aside,
there is no difference between the terms, statement and condition, as they are used
in this document. Both are treated exactly the same by the verifier. A condition
is simply a statement in the form of a proposition. A distinction is made
between them here only to make explanations of PROMELA constructs and
example models more understandable to the reader.
All statements in PROMELA are executed based on their executabilit)'. As
explained above, the execution of a statement is the act of successfully passing
a statement to its completion. Before this can happen, however, the statement
must be evaluated to determine if it can execute this is how an assignment
statement can be the same as a condition. If upon evaluation of the statement,
a non-zero value is returned meaning the condition/statement is not false
then it is executable and will execute. If it is not executable, then it cannot
execute and causes the process that contains it to block until it becomes
executable.
Interleaving, from a modeling perspective, can be understood partly as a control
construct. Because a statement/condition must be executable, it can be used
to block a process until it is true as opposed to polling some condition in a
loop using sequential programming methods. When one process blocks
waiting for a condition to be true, other processes can continue executing and
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may eventually cause that condition to become true. In this way the execution
of a process can be controlled through the way in which sequences of
statements are put together.
A PROMELA model can now be thought of, structurally, as a system of
concurrently executing sequential machines. As promised earlier, this can be
related to the size of the state space. This relation is due to the many possible
interleavings of statement executions of the sequential machines. Formal
verification requires that every possible interleaving be explored.
2.2 Syntax and Semantics of the Three Basic Elements
Systems are modeled in PROMELA as concurrently executing processes that
communicate in one of two ways: via message passing or shared variables. In
order to understand how this takes place, this section investigates in detail the
three basic elements of a PROMET. A model processes, channels, and
variables. In the examples below, the following conventions will be followed:
all keywords will be bold-face type
process names will begin with an upper-case letter
variables will begin with a lower-case letter
constants will be all upper-case letters
Example:
myLabel: /* This is a comment. */
printf("This statement is at 'myLabel'");
Before moving on to discuss the syntax and semantics of the language, three
minor points should be addressed that will aid in understanding the following
examples. They are all illustrated in the above example. Comments in
PROMELA are basically the same as in C and may not be nested. A label in
PROMELA is an identifier followed by a colon, which must be directly
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followed by a statement. Output in PROMELA is done using the printf
statement and is used the same way as in the C programming language.
Processes in PROMELA specify the behavior of the system. They contain a
sequence of statements in their declarations and each model must declare at
least one process. The way in which a process is declared dictates how it is
instantiated: Every process must be instantiated before it can execute. The
keywords proctype, ink, active, and run are used in the declaration and
instantiation of processes.
Example:
proctype DoesNothing ( )
{ skip }
active [2] proctype DoNothing (bit x)
{ skip }
init
{ run DoesNothing ( ) }
All of the three constructs in the above example define processes. The first
one uses the keyword proctype to define the process DoesNothing. There are
no parameters to be passed in to this process and it only hits one statement
that does not do anything. A skip statement, like those in the process
definitions above, is a pseudo-statement that has no effect on the system but is
sometimes needed for syntax requirements. The proctype declaration only
specifies the behavior of DoesNothing processes; however, some other process
must instantiate it before it can actually run. This is done here in the init
process.
PROMELA provides two ways to start processes upon initialization init and
active processes. If an init process declaration is present, then it is always
started upon initialization of a simulation or verification run. Consequently,
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the init process can have no parameters passed in, and there can never be
more than one present in any system specification.
The active keyword is also used to start up processes upon system
initialization. The difference is that the active proctype declaration can be
used just like any other proctype declaration. Because they are instantiated
upon system initialization, the issue of parameters must be addressed. In the
above example, the parameter, x, is automatically passed in as a 0 as are all
parameters for active processes. Upon system initialization, two DoNothing
processes are started notice the bracketed 2 in the declaration. As all three of
these initialization processes are started, they will be assigned process ids 0 to 2
in the order that they happen to be instantiated.
Assume the init process is instantiated first, given it a process id of 0. Then
the two DoNothing processes will be instantiated with process ids 1 and 2. The
last process to be instantiated will be the DoesNothing process. At this point,
there are three instantiated processes in the system with one statement each.
Assume that the DoNothing process with the process id of 1 now executes its
skip statement. It is at the end of its code, but it is not allowed to terminate
because there is another process in the system with a higher value process id
so it just waits. Now the other DoNothing process executes its skip statement.
After this occurs, it is allowed to terminate because it has the highest value
process id in the system. This causes the first DoNothing process to terminate
and release its process id. Now there is only one instantiated process in the
system, the init process. At this time it executes the run statement, and
creates a new DoesNothing process with a process id of 1. In this way, process
ids are recycled in a last-in first-out fashion. Once the DoesNothing process
executes its skip statement, it terminates and allows the init process to do the
same.
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As stated before, processes consist of a sequence of statements and a statement
consists of one or more identifiers. These identifiers can be variables or
predefined or user specified data types. There are five basic data types: bit,
bool, byte, short, and int. As one would expect, they look and act the same as
their C counterparts to include having a size that is architecture dependent.
Any of these five keywords can be used to declare variables of their respective
types just as they are used in C. A key difference between PROMELA and C is
that variables are always initialized to 0 by default.
.Another data type in PROMELA is introduced with the keyword, mtype. This
data type is used to specify a set of symbolic names used throughout the
program. There can only be one mtype definition (set of symbolic names) in
each model. Once the set ofmtype identifiers is defined, they can be declared
and used throughout the program like any of the basic data types.
The advantages of using a symbolic name over one of the basic data types are
twofold. First, models tend to make much more sense when meaningful
names can be used in place of some numerical value this is especially true
when sending messages over channels. Second, because the symbolic names
really represent a constant value rather than a variable, the state space of the
system can be reduced.
PROMELA also supports arrays and structures. Only one-dimensional arrays
are available; two-dimensional arrays can be simulated using arrays of
structures, however. Structures are declared using the keyword typedef. Aside
from the different keyword, the syntax for both arrays and structures is the
same as in C.
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Example:
mtype = { TYPE1, TYPE2 , TYPE3 } ; /* 1, 2, 3 */
typedef Structure {
bit myBit [3] = 1 ; /* all = 1 */
bool myBool [3] ; /* all = 0 */
byte myByte;
/* = 0 */
short myShort = 0 ; /* = 0 */
int mylnt - 5; /* = 5 */
mtype myMtype
};
Structure myStruct;
/* = 0 */
The result of the above example is a single instantiated structure, myStruct.
The first statement defines the symbolic names in an mtype definition for this
system specification. The comments on the right show the values given to
each symbolic name or variable upon instantiation. Notice that the set of
mtypes starts at the value 1, and not 0.
The typedef definition packages all of the elements declared in it just like
structures in C. The only important difference here is the way arrays are
initialized. The notation declaring the array myBit initializes all of the elements
of the array to 1. No loops are needed to initialize the entire array to the same
value.
Notice that myMtype is initialized to 0, however, there is no corresponding value
in the mtype definition. If the designer does not deliberately set this field to a
meaningful value, then it is not defined as a valid mtype in terms of the
specification even though it is valid to contain its initialized value of 0.
Variables declared hidden are write-only variables. Hidden variables can help
reduce the number of global states of the system, because their values are not
important and are not considered as part of the system state. Usually, hidden
variables are not necessary because there is a predefined scratch variable named
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by _ (the underscore). The only reason to declare something hidden is when
you want a meaningful name for a value that you will discard anyway an
unlikely scenario.
Two other predefined variables are used in PROMELA. The first is _pid, a
local variable to each process containing the process id. No two instantiated
processes can have the same value for their respective As stated
before, however, process ids are recycled upon process termination, so the
same value for a _pidcan be assigned to different processes that are not
instantiated concurrently.
The other predefined variable
_last,
is a global variable holding the process id
of the last process to execute a statement. This can be very useful in tracking
and guiding the interleaving of statement executions.
+ addition > greater than && boolean and
subtraction >= greater than
or equal to
1 1 boolean or
* multiplication < less than & bitwise and
/ division <= less than or
equal to
1 bitwise or
O modulus == equal ~ complement
++ increment i = not equal >> shift right
-" decrement ! negation << shift left
Table 2.1: PROMELA operators.
Operations on the above data types are also similar to C. Table 2.1 summarizes
the allowable operations.
Channels can be either local or global, and can model either synchronous or
asynchronous communication. Communication over channels involves the
exchange of messages.
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Example.
xr myChanl; /* exclusive reads from myChanl */
xs myChan2 ;
/* exclusive writes to myChan2 */
There are two assertions that can be made on channels to facilitate partial-
order reduction during system verification. These assertions, placed inside a
process, make claim that the process has either exclusive read or exclusive write
access to the channel. Such assertions are checked at verification time. This
includes checking that only the specified process has the named access, and
that operations on the channels are free from side-effects. Side-effects on
channels result from using query functions that require both read and write
access to a channel.
The messages sent over or received from a channel can be of any type except
arrays. The number of fields in a message, and the types that they represent,
can have a substantial impact on the size of the global state space. One way to
trim down the state space is to be very conservative in the construction of
messages to be sent, (i.e., use symbolic names for message fields instead of
bytes, shorts, or ints)
PROMELA allows incomplete messages to be sent over or received from a
channel. When an incomplete message is sent over a channel, the receiver
treats an empty field as undefined. When too many message fields are sent
over a channel, the receiver simply disregards any extra fields.
Asynchronous communications, or buffered messaging, allows multiple
messages to reside in a channel at the same time. The upper-bound on the
number of messages that can reside in the channel is specified at the time the
channel is defined. The lower-bound for a channel that utilizes asynchronous
communication is one. Synchronous communication, or rendez-vous
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communication, does not allow any messages to reside in the channel. This
type of communication requires a channel to be defined with a zero length.
Example:
chan rendezvous = [0] of { myStruct };
chan queue = [10] of { mtype };
For the rendezvous channel above, send statements and receive statements must
match, requiring process synchronization. Because this operation is
synchronous, only two processes can take place in the interaction. If the
sender process reaches its send before the receiver reaches its receive, then the
sender process will block until the receiver process reaches its receive
statement. On the other hand, if the receiver process reaches its receive before
the sender reaches its send, then the receiver process will block until the sender
process reaches its send statement. It is obvious that there must be some
lower-level handshaking going on, however, PROMELA allows for the
removal of this unnecessary detail from the model.
Example:
myChan! message; /* a send operation */
myChan! !message; /* a sorted-send operation */
There are two types of sends and two types of receives that can be used in the
exchange of messages. A send operation is represented by ! (an exclamation
point) and deposits messages into the channel at the tail. A sorted-send
operation is represented by !! (two exclamation points) and orders (just the
message being sent) in the channel (queue). This is done by starting at the
front of the queue and placing the message in front of the first message that
has a larger value than itself (a type of ascending order). The value of the
message is determined by taking all message fields into account. Also, both
types of send operations will block if the channel is full.
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Example:
myChan?A_CONSTANT; /* a conditional receive */
myChan? ?aVariable; /* a random- receive */
A receive operation is represented by ? (a question mark) and takes the
message at the front of the channel which it considers to be the oldest
message. A random-receive operation is represented by ?? (two question
marks) and takes any message currently in the channel randomly. Both of
these will block on an empty channel. Receives must store the message value
in a variable. Variables of the same type as the message fields or scratch
variables can be used. Receive operations can also be made conditional by
placing constant values in one or more of the message fields and is illustrated in
the example above. By doing this, receive operations will only be executable
when the constant values are the same as the values in the corresponding
message fields.
Query functions on channels can be used to determine the state of a channel.
This information can be used for control flow in the model, or for correctness
claims of the model. Some of these functions have side-effects which can
cause assertion violations on channels that require exclusive access.
Example:
myChan? [A_CONSTANT] ;
empty (myChan) ; /* true if empty */
full (myChan) ; /* true if full */
len (myChan) ;
All of the operations in the above example have side-effects. Receive
operations (?) can be converted from assignments to conditions by enclosing
the receiving message in square brackets. This can be very useful in checking
the exeajtability of receive operations that are conditional on some constant
value. The functions, empty and full, return boolean values pertaining to the
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state of myChan. The last function returns the number of messages in the
channel at the time the statement is executed. The returned values from any of
the above functions can be used for assignment statements or conditions, just
as they would in C.
Example.
nempty (myChan) ; /* true if not empty */
nfull (myChan) ; /* true if not full */
The query functions in the above example are the only two functions that are
free from side-effects. Therefore, they are the only query functions that can be
used in conjunction with exclusive access assertions.
This concludes the description of the three basic components of PROMELA
programs processes, variables, and channels. Every PROMELA model can
be understood at a structural level through these three elements. To
understand the behavior of a PROMELA model, the semantics of control flow
must be understood.
2.3 Syntax and Semantics ofControl Flow
Control of statement execution in PROMELA is as important as in any other
language. Methods of control can be separated into the following nine distinct
types:
Ordering of statements within a process
Interleaving of statements among processes
Jump statements
Selection statements
Repetition statements
Atomic sequences
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Conditional statements
Escape sequences
Timeout statements
The first was discussed earlier and pertains to the order in which a sequence or
statements is placed in a process. The executability of each statement provides
a conditional control mechanism for those statements. If a statement is not
executable, then the process will have to block until it becomes executable.
Consequently, one statement can be used as a guard for the sequence of
statements that follow it.
The second type of control is via interleaving, and is related to the first. A
process that is at a statement that is not executable is considered to be blocked.
Interleaving (which is how concurrency is modeled in PROMET , A) is a way to
unblock the process by making the unexecutable statement executable. This is
done by the execution of statements in other processes. Another process can
alter the state of the system, thus changing the executability of others
statements in the system.
Jumps in PROMELA are the easiest of the control flow constructs to
understand and are implemented using the goto statement. Jumps are always
executable: Whenever they are encountered in a statement sequence, control is
transferred to the statement immediately following the destination label.
Examples below illustrate jumps with repetition statements and atomic
sequences.
Example.
if
(a == b) -> a-- /* if a=b then a=a-l */
(a == c) -> a++ /* if a=c then a=a+l */
else -> a = 0 /* if a ! =b or c then a=0 */
fi
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Selection statements are similar to if-then-elsifelse constructs found in other
languages. The example above illustrates their syntax. The keyword if is used
to start the selection statement, and the keyword fi is used to end it. Each ::
(double colon) indicates a possible sequence of statements to be selected. The
single statement immediately following the double colon is called a guard. In
order for a statement sequence to be selected, the corresponding guard must
be true (executable). If the first two guards in the above example are not
executable, then the else can evaluate to true. An else statement is always
blocked when there is another possible choice.
What if both b and c are equal to a? Then there would be two guards that are
executable, and one of the two available statement sequences would be chosen
at random. It is not important which sequence is taken initially because in the
exploration of the entire state space, all possible paths will be explored anyway.
Example:
do
(a == b) -> break
(a == c) -> goto aLabell
else -> b-- ; C++
od;
a++ ; goto aLabel2 ;
aLabell :
a--;
aLabel2 :
skip ;
Repetition statements are syntactically similar to selection statements. Rather
than exiting when reaching the od keyword, the statement continually iterates.
Upon entering the loop above, the guards are evaluated for executability. If a
is equal to b, then the loop will terminate as a result of the break statement,
and control will transfer to the a++ statement. After incrementing a, a jump
will occur to the skip statement immediately following aLabeH. If a is equal to
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c, then a jump will occur to the statement immediately following aLabell and
eventually proceed through the skip statement. If a does not equal b or c, then
the else guard becomes executable. At this time b is decremented, then c is
incremented, and the repetition statement is reevaluated.
Atomic sequences are used to model test-and-set actions and to reduce the global
state space. Such statements begin with the keywords atomic or d_step, and
are immediately followed by a sequence of statements enclosed in braces. The
difference between the two types of atomic sequences, is that the sequence
declared using d_step must be deterministic, while the one declared using
atomic does not have to be. For a sequence to be deterministic, it cannot
have any jumps to outside of the sequence and only the first statement inside
the sequence is allowed to block. The distinction between the two is made,
because during verification deterministic sequences are executed more
efficiently.
Example.
atomic {
if
: : (a == b) -> goto aLabel
: : (a ! = b) -> a++
fi
};
d_step {
if
: : (a == b) -> skip
: : else -> a++
fi
};
aLabel :
skip ;
In the above example, if a true guard is evaluated, the statement following it is
executed immediately. In no way can the current process containing this code
be preempted by the interleaving of statements from another process. There is
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one exception to this rule. Because atomic sequences can block, another
process can execute if one of the statements in the sequence is not executable.
When the statement does become executable, however, control is shifted back
to the process with the blocked atomic sequence and the sequence is allowed
to run to completion as if it were not interrupted. This creates a certain
amount of overhead, and is the reason why d_step sequences are more
efficient.
Example:
(booleanCondition -> valuel : value2 \
Conditional expressions in PROMELA are similar to those in C. They are used as
a short-hand if-then-else, and can only contain expressions or conditions.
Because of this, they are always side-effect free. In the example above, when
booleanCondition is true, the expression evaluates to valuel . If it is false, the
expression evaluates to value2. Because booleanCondition must be either true or
false, the expression is always executable and will not block.
Escape sequences are declared using the keyword unless between statement
sequences. Execution begins with the statement sequence preceding unless.
Before any and each statement in the first sequence is evaluated, the first
statement of the sequence following unless is evaluated. If at any time this
first statement evaluates to true, then control is transferred to the second
sequence. This causes the first statement sequence to be abandoned, and the
first statement of the second sequence to be executed.
Example.
{ do
: : (a == b) -> skip
: : (a i = b) -> a++
od }
unless
{ (a == c) -> a := 0 }
24
The escape sequence above is entered when the first brace on the first line is
reached. The first event to occur is the evaluation of (a c). If it is true,
then the next statement to execute would be a = 0. However, assume that a is
equal to b. This would cause an evaluation/execution (they are the same for a
condition that is true) of the first guard in the loop. At this time (a == c) is
evaluated again to check if control can be transferred to the second sequence.
This way, the execution of the loop can be stopped between any statements,
not just between iterations.
The timeout statement is the final control mechanism to discuss. It is a reset
mechanism that becomes executable only when no other statements
throughout the system are executable. If this statement is encountered in an
invalid end-state, it can unknowingly allow deadlock to occur in the model.
For this reason, it is very important to use this statement conservatively and
with a specific purpose in mind.
The decision to implement timeout statements in PROMELA illustrates the
trade-off between modeling power and analytical power in modeling languages.
At the expense of modeling power, timing issues were deliberately abstracted
out of the language. The gain in analytical power comes from a reduction in
the state space by at least an order of magnitude. Timeout statements try to
regain some of the modeling power that was lost, while not giving up any of
the gain in analytical power.
Example.
proctype watchdog ( ) {
do
:: timeout -> guard! reset
od
}
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The above example [3] illustrates one of the many uses for timeout statements.
The defined process is a watchdog mechanism that attempts to reset the system
in the event that the system becomes deadlocked. This is done by sending the
message reset through the channel guard This assumes that some other process
in the system is capable of receiving the message, and will take further action to
reset the system.
This section served to present the basic notation and usage of control flow
constructs in PROMELA. More advanced usage of these constructs can be
seen later in larger examples. Compared to most languages they are relatively
few and simple. The next section shows how behavior can be checked in the
model of the system.
2.4 Correctness Claims
There are three ways in PROMELA to make claims of correctness: assertions,
state labels, and temporal claims. The topic of building models in PROMELA
will be addressed in the next chapter, but it should be kept in mind that the
more complex the correctness claim, the greater the size of the global state
space of the system. For this reason, whenever possible, the simplest adequate
correctness claim should be used.
Example.
assert ( booleanExpression ) ;
Assertions are by far the simplest correctness claim. They do not increase the
state space of the system at all. For a negligible increase in run-time overhead,
assertions check that a proposition holds at a given execution point. In the
example above, if the expression booleanExpression is true (non-zero), then the
statement has no effect. If it is false (zero), execution is aborted and that
assertion statement is flagged as an error.
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Example.
endloop :
do
:: myChanl ?mes sage -> myChan2 [message
od
End-state labels mark valid end-states, and are important when checking for
system deadlocks. By default, a process reaches a valid end-state when it runs
to the end of its code. If this is prevented by control flow in the process,
however, then a label using the predefined prefix end can be used to signify
that a process waiting in that state does not contribute to deadlock. In the
example above, the infinite loop is designated as a valid end-state; if the label
were not present, the state could be flagged as a deadlock state.
Example.
do
: : myChanl ?mes sage ->
progressWhenSent :
myChan2 ! message
od
Prvgress-state labels are used to find starvation loops in the design. Starvation
loops are cyclic sequences of states that can occur infinitely often. If one of
the states in the cyclic sequence is labeled as a progress state, then the sequence
of states is not considered a starvation loop. In the example above, there may
be a considerable number of interleavings of the two statements contained in
the loop with other processes in the system. Using the label ensures that cyclic
sequences of states that pass through this label will not be flagged as starvation
loops. This can be very important for networking protocols that are designed
for unreliable mediums.
Accept-state labels are restricted to be used within temporal claims. Accept-state
labels can be thought of as the opposite of progress-state labels. If an
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acceptance-state is found in a cyclic sequence of states, it is considered an
error.
Holzmann explains temporal claims as monitors for the system specification
that was defined earlier. They are defined using the keyword never. The
system specification is an asynchrvnous prvduct of the processes of the
constructed model. In contrast, the system combined with a temporal claim
can be thought ofmany synchronous products of all single traces of the state space.
Each trace is a depth-first search of the state space. The temporal claim moves
through its local state space by trying to match its propositions against each
state in each trace of the asynchronous product. If the temporal claim reaches
the end of its code or an acceptance-state is found in a cyclic sequence of
states, then an error is reported.
A temporal claim is a behavioral specification in the sense that it monitors
behavior. A model of the system is a behavioral specification in the sense that
it specifies the behavior. Temporal claims can only monitor undesirable
behaviors that are considered errors if present. .Any time a desirable behavior
is to be verified, it must first be converted to the corresponding undesirable
behavior.
Each statement in a temporal claim must take the form of a proposition,
making it side-effect free. If at any point a temporal claim alters the state of the
system by changing variables or sending messages, it invalidates the verification.
Because only a single behavior can be checked at a time, not more than one
claim can be present during verification.
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Example.
/*
* Formula As Typed: []p
* The Never Claim Below Corresponds
* To The Negated Formula ! ([]p)
* (formalizing violations of the original;
*/
never { / * ! ( [ ] p ) * /
T0_init:
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
: : ( ! ( (p) ) ) -> goto accept_all
fi;
accept_all :
skip
}
The above example never claim is provided to familiarize the reader with its
basic construction. It was generated using the LTL translator of SPIN. The
temporal claim states that it is an error if p is not true indefinitely, from the
initial system state. The (1) statement corresponds to an else statement and is
only executable if the other guard, (1 ((p))), is not executable. If at any time
during system execution p is false, the temporal claim will run to the end of its
code.
Example.
proctype example ( ) {
end:
do
: : skip
od
}
never {
accept :
do
: skip
od
}
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When any PROMELA process reaches the end of its code, the process does
not simply end. PROMELA is based on stuttering semantics, which is
necessary because of the link between temporal claims and linear-time
temporal logic (LTL). Because LTL formulae can only be defined over an
infinite sequence of states, stuttering semantics requires that the last reachable
state of a process occur infinitely often. This is guaranteed in PROMELA with
an implicit infinite loop at the end of each process. The above example
illustrates the equivalent syntax of these loops for both processes and temporal
claims.
This section introduced the usage and meaning of correctness claims. It is very
important that they be considered as the model of the system is being built to
get the greatest possible benefit with the least possible cost. Assertions require
the least amount of resources, followed by end-state labels. Temporal claims,
accept-state labels, and progress-state labels are definitely the most costly to
use.
2.5 Comments and Conclusions
PROMELA is a relatively compact language, even for a modeling language. It
builds on a few basic primitives and constructs, and remains a robust and
simple language. Because its syntax is based on C, it is very accessible to most
programmers. Learning the language itself is fairly simple. Learning to use the
language correctly and wisely is a little more difficult: This topic is discussed in
the next chapter.
Generally speaking, most of the problems with the correct usage of the
language concern side-effects, channels, atomic sequences, and correctness
claims. .Another problem with the language is the lack of a written formal
semantic definition for the language. Therefore, the verifier has the final say
on the semantics of the language. In effect, the only way to become familiar
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with the semantics of the language is through the tool. The problem with this
is part of the same problem that PROMELA/SPIN tries to solve guessing
how things work, instead of proving how things work.
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C h ap t e r 3
MODELING IN PROMELA
3.0 Introduction
With any new technology, there are always people who want to see just how far
they can push it. PROMELA/SPIN is no exception, and as a result it hits been
stretched beyond its original limits. PROMELA has been used to model
everything from communications protocols to hardware at the gate level.
There are many extensions to PROMELA which enhance its modeling ability
in areas like client/server applications and real-time systems. Whether models
are specified in PROMELA, PROMELA++, PROMELA R/T, PROMELA
C/S, or some other dialect, the fact is that some extensions are useful while
others are not.
This chapter presents two models that: (1) provide examples of the language,
(2) illustrate some of the different types of systems that can be modeled, and
(3) show how the same system can have different models. These modes are
important for the effective use of SPIN, and the examples cover the more
commonly used constructs of the language.
The next section discusses modeling of hardware circuits in PROMELA, using
an asynchronous D-Latch as an example. This is followed by a section with
two models of the Alternating-Bit Protocol. The chapter wraps up with
comments and conclusions on the ability of PROMELA to model these and
other systems.
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3.1 Modeling Hardware
This section on hardware modeling is based on the paper by Budi Rahardjo
[10] that gave an example verification of a simple asynchronous circuit. The
paper specifically addressed the problem of verifying that the asynchronous
circuit did not contain static hazards. This is a very important topic in
asynchronous circuit design, and a tool that can verify the absence of such
hazards would be very useful.
For this thesis, a D-Latch was modeled with and without static hazards. The
motivation for modeling a D-Latch is that it is commonly used in circuit
design. In an attempt to save space in presenting these models, both the
non-
hazard and hazard cases were combined into a single model because they are
identical except for the DLatch process. The K-map for the D-Latch is shown
in Figure 3.1.
d en
q \ 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 / 1 \
1 2> \1/ (Is)
Figure 3.1: K-map for a D-Latch.
The dotted line in the K-map represents the consensus term that may cause a
static hazard. The boolean equations corresponding to the two latches are:
No hazard: (d en) + (~en q) + (d q)
With hazard: (d en) + (~en q)
The italicized term represents the consensus term.
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The first design problem is how to model the lower-level elements of the latch.
This was a difficult task, and with good reason PROMELA was not designed
to model hardware. So following the methodology ofRahardjo's paper, C-style
macros were used to define each gate.
#define INVERTER ( I , O ) 0 != 1-1
#define AND2 (II, 12 ,0) 0 != I1&&I2
#define NAND2 (11,12,0) O != !(ll&&12)
ttdefine 0R3 (11,12,13,0) O != II | | 12 | | 13
> O = 1-1
> 0 = I1&&I2
> 0 = ! (I1&&I2)
> 0 =111 112 I 113
It took a while to understand why Rahardjo chose this representation. For
each gate, if the new value is not the same as the old value, then the value of
the gate's output is updated. Otherwise, the guard in the macro definition will
block and no update will occur. This is the behavior that the DLatch processes
are based upon. The problem here is that only simple logical operations can be
used in conjunction with the bit data type. This limits the states that can be
modeled to HI (1) and LO (0).
bit d, en, q, qOld, newlnput;
/* No Hazard Here */
proctype DLatch(){
bit 11, 12, 13, 14;
do
: : if
INVERTER (en, 11)
AND2(d, q, 12)
AND2(d, en, 13)
AND2(11, q, 14)
OR3(12, 13, 14, q)
fi;
newlnput = 0
od
}
/* Hazard Here */
proctype DLatch(){
bit 11, 12, 13;
do
: : if
INVERTER (en, 11)
NAND2(d, en, 12)
NAND2(11, q, 13)
NAND2(12, 13, q)
fi;
newlnput = 0
od
}
Now that the gates that make up the latches are complete, the behavior of the
latches themselves can be specified. The process definitions for both latches
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are above. The process definitions below are self-contained. Therefore, they
can be used interchangeably.
The DLatch processes above iterate in an infinite loop to model the continuous
behavior of real asynchronous hardware. The iterations of the loop are
controlled by the macros defined above. If there are changes made to the
global variables that model input, then an iteration of the loop will occur. This
will inevitably cause newlnput to be set to zero.
proctype Stimulus () {
do
: : timeout -:> d_step { newlnput = 1; qOld = q;
if
: : d = 1 - d;
: : en = 1 - en;
fi
}
od
}
The process definition above represents the stimulus to be applied to the latch
being verified. The problem here is that in order to know when another input
combination can be applied to the latch, it must be known that the output of
the latch is stable. This is done by waiting for system deadlock to occur so that
the timeout statement will become executable, which requires that the latch
process block when stable. Notice also that the updates are made as an atomic
step. This is necessary to prevent race conditions on the global variables in the
d_step sequence.
init {
atomic { run Stimulus (); run DLatch () }
}
The init process above simply instantiates the necessary processes to perform
the verification. An atomic sequence is used here to reduce the state space of
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the system by reducing the number of possible interleavings. Due to a finite
upper bound (which is unknown) on the number of processes that can be
instantiated in the system concurrently, a d_step sequence could not be used
here because the run statements could potentially block. As a general rule, if
the essential behavior of the system is not compromised by the use of one of
these statements, then they should be used whenever possible.
never {
Top:
do
:: ((newlnput ==0) && (qOld != q) ) -:> break
: else -:> skip
Od;
do
((newlnput == 0) && (qOld != q) )
( (newlnput ==0) && (qOld == q) ) -:> break
(newlnput == 1) -:> goto Top
od
}
The never claim above monitors the input and output of the latch to check for
hazards. The claim simply monitors the output for more than one change per
input. The first loop looks for the first change in the output only after the
latch starts updating due to a change in input. If the output changes again
while in the second loop, then the claim is matched and an error is reported.
If not, and another input is applied, then the claim resets itself.
There are other ways ofmodeling hardware to avoid some of the issues raised
in this section, but these would increase the state space. For instance, the
undefined (unknown) state could be added to the model using symbolic types.
The problem here is that representing gates with macro definitions would no
longer do: Procedures would have to be modeled using processes. This in turn
creates a problem for returning values: Should channels or global variables be
used? If one or more channels for each basic element were created, how large
a circuit could be modeled?
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PROMELA has difficulty modeling hardware because it was not designed for
this task: It was created as a protocol modeling language. Hardware modeling
requires other constructs in a modeling language than those needed by
protocols. For example, processes are poor at modeling procedures because
channels are needed to return values, and this requires too many system
resources. At the very least, PROMELA would have to efficiently handle
procedure or function calls in order to reasonably construct hardware models.
3.2 Modeling Protocols
Communications protocols have continually increased in complexity, in part
due to their inherent concurrency and multitude of interactions. This inherent
complexity is compounded by increasing performance demands. For all of
these reasons, it is extremely difficult to guarantee correct protocol operation.
The PROMELA modeling language was created to formally specify protocols
and to help eliminate some of these problems. As is shown in the following
examples, many of the basic mechanisms of the language were included
specifically to handle protocol behavior. While, it is important to model
behavior, a language must also be able to model different levels of abstraction.
Both of these issues are addressed in this section.
The protocol used as an example is the Alternating-Bit Protocol (ABP). This is
a point-to-point protocol, which means that messages are transferred between
two known sites. The protocol is full-duplex: Data can flow in both directions.
The ABP is also a synchronous protocol, meaning that one aknowledgement
must be received before the next message can be sent. Acknowledgments
themselves are always piggy-backed on data packets. Finally, the protocol must
work in the presence of an unreliable medium.
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The first model was specified at a very low level of abstraction, with the
intention of using the simulator to better understand the interactions in the
model. With this in mind, the unreliable medium was explicitly modeled to
support injection of known errors into the system. This in turn showed how
the protocol recovered from errors.
Usually, the construction of a model would start from a high level of
abstraction and work its way down to the limits of the verification tool. The
opposite approach is taken here because this first model was not intended to
be verified, only simulated. This is one of the major benefits of the SPIN
tool the simulator and verifier are separate.
The description of the model is interleaved with the code as it was originally
specified. Consequently, it should be easier to read and understand the model.
The code can be extracted in order and simulated/verified using SPIN.
"define STOP_AT 5
^define MAX_TIME 7
^define ERR0R_RATE1 2 56
"define ERROR_RATE2 2 56
The first five lines define constants that the user can set before a simulation
run. STOP_AT sets the upper bound on the number of messages transmitted
in the system. This was used to gracefully terminate the simulation run.
Above, it is set to five, so the first process to reach its fifth message will send a
termination message.
MAX_TIME sets an upper bound for a logical clock used to simulate a
timeout. The error rates specify how often an error should be inserted by the
medium in either direction.
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init {
chan StoM = [2] of { bit, bit, byte }
chan MtoR = [2] of { bit, bit, byte }
chan RtoM = [2] of { bit, bit, byte }
chan MtoS = [2] of { bit, bit, byte }
atomic { run SenderReceiver (MtoS, StoM, 1);
run Medium(StoM, MtoS, RtoM, MtoR) ;
run SenderReceiver (MtoR, RtoM, 0) } ;
}
The init process manages the initialization of the system, instantiating four
channels used to communicate between the three processes init starts
atomically. The fields of the messages are a control bit, an acknowledgment
bit, and a message sequence number. The size of the channels is set at two,
however, due to the synchronous nature of the protocol, there will not be
more than one message stored in a channel.
proctype Medium (chan froml, tol, f rom2 , to2) {
byte errorByte, tempByte;
bit tempBitl, tempBit2, looseMsg, badMsg;
errorByte = 1;
As stated before, the Medium process acts as an unreliable medium that injects
errors at a user specified frequency. In this model, the medium can loose or
corrupt messages. The first few lines above simply set up some temporary and
logical variables to be used by the process.
Top:
do
: : skip ->
Because there is only one Medium process, which must simulate full-duplex
transmission, the process has to alternate between the two incoming channels.
Its basic operation is to check each incoming channel for messages, then
process that message (if there is one) according to the error control
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information. The medium then switches to the other channel and performs
the same steps in a loop. The only guard of the main loop was intentionally
made a skip to make sure it is always executable.
if
:: nempty (f roml) ->
froml?tempBitl, tempBit2 , tempByte
:: empty(froml) -> goto Resetl
fi;
The selection statement above is used to check if there are any messages
currently in the channel. The check-and-remove operation need not be atomic
because each process in the system has exclusive read and write access to its
input and output channels, respectively. If a message is found in the channel, it
is saved in temporary storage, otherwise a jump is made to update the error
control mechanism for the next iteration.
if
(looseMsg ==1) -> goto Reset2
(badMsg ==1) -> to2 ! tempBitl, tempBit2 , 0
else -> to2 ! tempBitl , tempBit2 , tempByte
fi;
The preceding selection statement can only be executed if a message was
received in the last selection statement. Based on the settings of the error
control information for this channel, it will do one of three things. First, if
looseMsg is set, then it will dump the message by just ignoring it. If this
happens, a check of the next channel will not occur. It will only update the
other channels error control information before re-servicing this channel again.
Second, if badMsg is set, then the message is passed on with a zero in the
sequence number field to indicate that a resend is needed. Finally, if another
guard is executable, the message is sent unaltered.
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Resetl :
looseMsg = 0;
badMsg = 0 ;
if
(errorByte%ERROR_RATEl==0) -> looseMsg=l
(errorByte%ERROR_RATEl==0) -> badMsg = 1
else -> skip
fi;
The statements above update the error information for the channel. The
modulus operator is used to inject errors at a known frequency into the
exchange of messages. It is important to notice that one of the two errors must
occur at the time specified. This is because the else statement only becomes
executable when no other guard is. The else statement can be removed so that
errors may occur when specified, but this defeats the purpose of knowing when
an error will arise.
if
:: nempty (f rom2 ) ->
f rom2?tempBitl , tempBit2 , tempByte
:: empty (from2) -> goto Reset2
fi;
The remainder of the Medium process performs the same tasks on the other
input channel. There are a few differences that should be recognized.
if
:: (tempByte == 255) -> goto StopMedium
: : else -> skip
fi;
if
(looseMsg ==1) -> goto Resetl
(badMsg ==1) -> tol ! tempBitl , tempBit2 , 0
else -> tol ! tempBitl , tempBit2 , tempByte
fi;
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First, the selection statement above looks for the termination message: when it
arrives, the medium allows the process to reach its end of code.
Reset2 :
looseMsg = 0;
badMsg = 0 ;
if
(errorByte%ERROR_RATE2==0) -> looseMsg=l
(errorByte%ERROR_RATE2==0) -> badMsg = 1
else -> skip
fi;
errorByte++
Od;
StopMedium:
skip
}
The other point is that the counter that is used for error control is updated.
This is the reason why the jump to Reset2 is made in the event of a lost
message above.
proctype SenderReceiver (chan in, out; bit first) {
byte clock, lastMsgln, msgln, msgOut;
bit controlln, ackln, controlOut, ackOut;
d_step {
if
:: (first ==1) -> ackOut = 1; msgOut = 1
:: else -> controlOut = 1; goto Receive
fi
};
The last process in the specificationthat actually specifies the behavior of the
protocolis the Sender-Receiver process. .As the name implies, it performs both
sends and receives, making this a full-duplex protocol. The channels passed in
are used to communicate with the medium. The bit, first, designates which
Sender-Receiver-
process should initiate communication. This is necessary due to
the synchronous nature of the protocol data and acknowledgments must
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proceed in lock-step for each process. The first few lines use this information
to initialize the process and make sure that they start in the correct states.
Send:
atomic {out ! controlOut , ackOut , msgOut ; clock = 0};
The send operation for this protocol is simple, requiring no conditional
information to be associated with it. The ability to send a new message is
controlled by the receive operation. What the Sendmust do, however, is reset
the logical clock each time it sends a new message. To ensure that the message
is sent and the clock is reset at the same moment, an atomic sequence is used.
Receive:
do
:: nempty(in) -> in?controlIn, ackln,msgln; break
: : empty (in) ->
if
: : (clock >= MAX_TIME) -> goto Send
: : else -> clock++
fi;
od;
The preceding repetition statement is both a receive and timeout mechanism.
After sending a message, the process must wait by polling the incoming
channel for the expected acknowledgment. If it does arrive, then the loop will
terminate and the process will proceed to analyze the acknowledgment. For
each iteration where no acknowledgment arrives, one of two things will
happen: Either the logical clock will be incremented (if it is less than
MAXfTIME), or a timeout occurs and the message is resent.
There are two reasons for using a logical clock. First, the only alternative is the
timeout statement, which relies on system deadlock. The second reason is
related to the state space explosion problem. While there are real-time
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extensions to PROMELA that provide time, the consequence is a state space
that is one or two orders ofmagnitude larger.
The remaining selection statements analyze the incoming message for
consistency and validity. Based on some criterion, the selection statements
direct the process to the next appropriate step in the protocol.
if
: : (msgIn==lastMsgIn) -> goto Receive
: : else -> lastMsgln = msgln
fi;
The above selection statement filters out duplicate packets thatwere sent as the
result of a timeout. It checks the new message sequence number against the
old message sequence number to see if thev are the same. This would indicate
that the new message was already received, and that ignoring it would do no
harm.
if
:: ((msgln > 0) && (msgln != 255)) ->
ackOut - controlln
:: (msgln == 255) -> out ! 0 , 0,255; goto Stop
: : else -> goto Send
fi;
The selection statement above looks for valid messages. These are messages
with sequence numbers from 1 to 254, inclusive. In this case, the
acknowledgment sent in the next message is set to the control number just
received. A sequence number of zero is reserved to indicate that a
retransmission is required. In such cases, no internal updates occur and the last
message is resent.
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A sequence number of 255 represents a termination message, as specified
earlier. This causes a termination message to be sent, and used to gracefully
terminate the medium while directing this process to the end of its code.
if
: : (ackln == controlOut) ->
controlOut = 1 - controlOut; msgOut++
: : else -> goto Send
fi;
The above selection statement checks the latest acknowledgment against the
control number that was sent in the last message. If they do not match, then
an error occurred and the last message must be resent. This is different from
the previous selection statement in that this one looks for corrupted
acknowledgments. If the acknowledgement and control number match, then
the control information and message sequence number for the next packet are
updated.
if
:: (msgOut >= STOP_AT) -> out 10,0,2 55
: : else -> goto Send
fi;
Stop: skip
}
The last selection statement sends a termination message when the maximum
number of messages have been sent. When this happens, it allows the process
executing the statement to run to the end of its code.
This specification definitely contains more detail than is necessary to verify the
protocol is correct. It was intended to create a better understanding of the
protocol. It is not necessary, however, to model the medium, different types
of errors, message sequence numbers, or a finite upper bound on the number
45
ofmessages to be sent. These will all be removed in the second version of the
specification (created with exhaustive verification in mind) .
#define MAX_TIME 7
mtype = { GOOD_PACKET , BAD_PACKET } ;
The verification model has many fewer statements than the simulation model.
The goal here was to keep the state space as small as possible while specifying
the essential behavior of the protocol. To do this, the logical clock mechanism
was kept and the first line of the program sets its upper bound. The second
line shows the symbolic names that were added to represent good and bad
message packets. This eliminates the need for a sequence numbering scheme.
init {
chan StoR = [1] of { bit, bit, mtype };
chan RtoS = [1] of { bit, bit, mtype };
atomic { run SenderReceiver (RtoS, StoR, 1) ;
run SenderReceiver (StoR, RtoS, 0);
}
}
The init process is very much the same. There is no medium to instantiate,
because the two SenderReceiver- processes send messages directly to each other.
The only significant difference is the message format for the channels. Instead
of bytes for sequence numbers, symbolic types are used to represent good or
bad messages: There is no reason to distinguish between bad data or bad
control information. Finally, the size of the channel was set to one.
Setting the verifier to loose messages when a channel is full, shows the
synchronous nature of this protocol. The result of such verifications is that no
messages are lost. This confirms that the protocol is synchronized, and that
each time a message is place in a channel it is removed before another message
is sent.
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proctype SenderReceiver (chan in, out; bit first) {
byte clock, msgln;
bit controlln, ackln, controlOut, ackOut;
xr in; xs out;
if
:: (first == 1) -> ackOut = 1
: : else -> controlOut = 1; goto Receive
fi;
The SenderReceiver- process was revised to represent all protocol behavior
including the unreliability of the medium. The first seven lines in the process
declaration initialize the process for communication. As before, necessary
variables are declared and initialized to their proper values according to first.
The big difference here is the line containing the channel assertions. The xr
and xs assertions allow for partial-order reduction during verification runs if
they are not violated. This reduces the memory requirements by almost an
order ofmagnitude.
Send:
atomic {
if
out ! controlOut , ackOut , GOOD_PACKET; clock=0
out ! controlOut , ackOut , BAD_PACKET; clock=0
skip
fi;
};
The atomic sequence following the Send label above models the unreliable
medium. Whenever a message is sent, one of three things can happen. First, a
good message can be sent and the logical clock reset, which would indicate that
the protocol is operating normally. Second, a bad message can be sent and the
logical clock reset, which would indicate that a message was corrupted. Third,
nothing is sentwhich would mean that the message was lost.
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Receive:
do
: : (clock >= MAX_TIME) -> goto Send
: : else -> clock++
od
unless (nempty(in) -> in?control!n, ackln,msgln}
The receive operation is modeled using an escape sequence. It makes the
receive conditional on a non-empty channel without side-effects. This is
important because a violation of the channel assertions would terminate a
verification run. The escape sequence also allows for the loop to be preempted
between each statement of each iteration. Therefore, if a message arrives late,
say just before the goto Send statement, the escape sequence will still be
invoked and the message processed.
if
: : (ackln==control0ut && msgIn==GO0D_PACKET) ->
controlOut = 1-controlOut ; ackOut = controlln
:: (ackln! =controlOut && msgIn==GOOD_PACKET) ->
ackOut = controlln
: : else -> skip
fi;
goto Send
}
The above selection statement sets the values of the fields for the next message
to be sent. The first sequence means a good message was received with the
correct acknowledgment. Consequently, the control bit is toggled and the
acknowledgment updated. The second sequence means that a good packet was
received with a negative acknowledgment. This causes no change in the
control bit (a resend of the last data), but the acknowledgment is still updated.
In other words, this process will resend its old data with its old control bit, but
it will still acknowledge the last transmission. The last statement causes a
complete retransmission of the last packet in the event that neither of the
other two guards is executable.
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This model is considerably smaller than the first one, because it was intended
to perform a different function. PROMELA is very good at representing
systems at different levels of abstraction; this is one of the greatest strengths of
the language. The verification model above could have been made even
smaller by removing the logical clock and using the timeout statement instead,
while the simulation model could have been specified with even more detail.
3.3 Comments and Conclusions
This chapter had three goals. The first was to introduce the PROMELA
language itself. In the three models shown, most of the common elements
were used. Overall, PROMELA is a small and simple language that is easy to
learn. As with any other language, however, practice and experience provide
greater insight into the different and better ways to represent systems.
The second goal was to show the different types of systems that could be
modeled with PROMELA. As with most things in this universe, PROMELA
is best suited for its intended application area, and less well suited for other
domains. The above examples illustrate this. It is important not only to
understand the strengths of a technology to use it properly, but also to
understand its shortcomings and limitations.
The last goal was to show how PROMELA can model systems at different
levels of abstraction. This is very important in modeling languages used to
create specifications that are verified by model checkers. Many times, only a
part of the entire system can be modeled and verified due to the limits of
system resources. A modeling language that is amenable to slight changes in
detail can maximize both resource utilization and confidence in the verified
system.
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Chapter 4
SPIN'S FUNCTIONALITY
4.0 Introduction
This chapter explores the functionality of the SPIN validation tool (version
2.9.6). There have been many changes to SPIN since its inception, and it
continues to evolve. Changes in the tool take the form of bug fixes, extensions
to functionality, and alterations in the underlying algorithms. The source code
and documentation for the entire PROMELA/SPIN/XSPIN validation
environment are freely available from Gerard Holzmann at Bell Labs.
SPIN's main functions are to perform simulations and verifications of a
PROMELA model. The simulator can perform random, interactive, or guided
simulations. The verifier can perform exhaustive searches of the state space
with and without partial-order reduction, or it can perform a bit-state space
analysis for maximum coverage of the state space of a system that cannot be
exhaustively verified. The tool also includes a translator for converting linear-
time temporal logic (LTL) formulae into finite state automaton, and a graphical
user interface extension called XSPIN.
The next section describes the simulator and all its functions the three modes
of operation and the LTL translator. The following section focuses on how
the verifier can be used to perform different types of verifications. Next is an
introduction to XSPIN and the added functionality that it brings. The final
section presents comments and conclusions. Examples illustrating the tool's
functionality are based on the models from the last chapter.
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4.1 Simulations with SPIN
The basic command for using the simulator is:
spin [-option] [-option] fileName
There can be any number of options used for a simulation run as long as they
do not conflict with each other. For each run, the last argument is the name of
the PROMELA specification file.
Option Description
Indicates an interactive simulation run.
Indicates a guided simulation run using a generated simulation trail.
]N Will skip the first
A"
steps of a guided simulation run.
nN Sets the seed of the random number generator to N.
m Loose the messages sent to a full queue.
Print the values of all local variables.
g Print the values of all global variables.
Print all send operations.
Print all receive operations.
Print all statements executed.
Print all warning information available.
Print a symbol table containing all initial system information.
Print the current version of the tool being used.
Translate an LTL formula into a never claim.
Generate a verifier called pan.c.
Table 4.1: Simulation options for SPIN.
The simulation options are summarized in Table 4.1 above. The table contains
the option identifier and a short description of what it is used for. Similar
information can be obtained by invoking the help option via spin - ?. The
remainder of this section uses different combinations of options from the table
to provide examples for using the tool.
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When SPIN is used as a simulator, its default mode is random. A random
simulation with no options gives very little information by default. For this
reason, options should be used to help check system behaviors. The following
example uses the simulation model of the Alternating-Bit Protocol from the
last chapter.
Example.
C:\>spin -n9 -p FullDuplexAB_S.pml
0
1
1
2:
2:
149:
150:
151:
152:
153:
154:
proc - (:root:) creates proc 0 (:init:)
proc 0 ( : init : ) creates proc 1 (SR)
proc 0 (:init:) line 211 "FullD'uplexAB_S
(state 4) [(run SR (MtoS, StoM, 1) ) ]
proc 0 (-.init:) creates proc 2 (Medium)
proc 0 (:init:) line 213 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
(state 2) [ (run Medium(StoM,MtoS, RtoM,MtoR) ) ]
proc 3
(state
proc 3
(state
proc 1
(state
proc 2
(state
proc 2
(state
proc 3
(state
(SR) line
54) [((ackl
(SR) line
50) [contro
(SR) line
29) [((cloc
(Medium) 1
63) [(1
(Medium) 1
10) [el
(SR) line
51) [msgOut
94 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
n==controlOut ) ) ]
96 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
lout = (1-controlOut) ]
7 0 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
k:>=7 ) ) ]
ine 13 6 "FullDuplexAB_S .pml '
)]
ine 138
se]
97
'FullDuplexAB_S .pml '
"Ful lDuplexAB_S . pml "
(msgOut+1) ]
In this example, the statements were printed as a result of the p option. In
total, there are 1076 statement executions for the run. .All of this information
is useless one knows what to look for. The n option was used to alter the seed
value for the random simulation run.
Interactive simulation lets the user guide the execution of statements. During
an interactive simulation, the system will execute statements until a non-
deterministic choice must be made. At that time, the user will be prompted to
input the number of the statement to execute next. The following example
shows how this works.
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Example.
C:\>spin -i FullDulexAB_S.pml
Select a statement
choice 1: proc 3 (SR) line 35 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
(state 1) [clock = 0]
choice 2: proc 2 (Medium) line 13 0
"FullDuplexAB_S.pml" (state 1) [looseMsg = 0]
choice 3: proc 1 (SR) line 35 "fulldu~l
(state 1) [clock = 0]
choice 4: proc 0 ( : init : ) line 216
"FullDuplexAB_S (state 5) unexecutable, [-end-]
Select [1-4] : 2
Select a statement
choice 1: proc 3 (SR) line 35 FullDuplexAB_S
(state 1) [clock = 0]
choice 2: proc 2 (Medium) line 136
"FullDuplexAB_S.pml" (state 63) [(1)]
choice 3: proc 1 (SR) line 35 "FullDuplexAB_S.pml"
(state 1) [clock = 0]
choice 4: proc 0 ( : init : ) line 216
"FullDuplexAB_S.pml" (state 5) unexecutable, [-end-]
Select [1-4]
Interactive simulation runs can be very time consuming, and should only be
used when looking for something very specific. The time needed by an
interactive run can be reduced by using XSPIN.
The last type of simulation is a guided simulation. These simulation runs are
based on a state trail written to disk (in file pan_in.trail) as a result of an error
during a verification run. Guided simulations are one of the tool's best
features: A claim or property violation can be detected in a verification run,
and can be exposed by performing a guided simulation run.
Example.
C:\>spin -t -v -j8 pan_in
8: proc 1 (SenderReceiver) line 16 "pan_in"
(state 9) [clock = 0]
9: proc 1 (SenderReceiver) line 19 "pan_in"
(state 14) [ . (goto) ]
spin: line 19 "pan_in , Error: assertion violated
10: proc 1 (SenderReceiver) line 19 "pan_in"
(state 15) [assert (0)]
spin: trail ends after 10 steps
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The example above was constructed using the verification model of the
Alternating-Bit Protocol. An assert(O) statement was placed in the model to
guarantee an error. During verification, an error is produced, the verification
stops, and the verifier automatically writes the state trail to file.
Example.
C:\>spin -f "p -:> <:>q"
never { /* p -> <:>q */
T0_init:
if
: : (1) -:> goto T0_S2
: : ( ( ! ( (p) ) II (q) ) ) -> goto accept_all
fi;
T0_S2 :
if
: : (1) -:> goto T0_S2
: : ( (q) ) -:> goto accept_all
fi;
accept_all:
skip
}
C:\>spin -f " ! (p -> <>q) "
never { /* ! (p -> <:>q) */
accept_init :
T0_init :
if
:: (! ( (q) ) && (p) ) -:> goto accept_S3
fi;
accept_S3 :
T0_S3 :
if
: : ( ! ( (q) ) ) -> goto accept_S3
fi;
accept_al 1 :
skip
}
The last simulator component is the LTL Translator. As stated in Chapter 2, a
never claim models an undesirable behavior. Therefore, when translating an
LTL formula into a never claim, the LTL formula must specify a behavior that
represents a violation if it is matched. It should be noted, however, that it is
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possible to specify desirable behaviors with a never claim by negating the LTL
formula before translation. The preceding example shows two never claims
produced by the translator the second is the negation of the first.
The first claim asserts that it is an error if the following behavior is matched: If
p becomes true at some point during system execution, then q must eventually
become true. The second claim asserts exactly the opposite of this.
Two syntactic rules were followed in devising the LTL formulae. First,
predicates must be lower-case, which means that all variable names used in the
formula must start with a lower-case letter. Second, there can be no spaces
between the characters that make up a single logical operator. Table 4.2
summarizes the legal operators in LTL formulae.
Operators Description
[] Always
<> Eventually
U Strong until
V Dual of until
&& or A And
II or \/ Or
i Negation
-> Implication
<-> Equivalence
Table 4.2: Legal LTL Translator operators.
Simulations are a valuable way to debug PROMELA specifications. They
provide feedback to the user (especially through XSPIN) relatively quickly.
Random simulations are great at finding the obvious bugs in a newly
constructed model. Interactive simulations allow a user to quickly check a
suspicious statement sequence. Guided simulations are perfect for pinpointing
hard-to-find bugs discovered during a verification run.
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4.2 Verifications with SPIN
To perform a verification run, the simulator builds a C program from a
PROMELA specification via the a option. The C program is then compiled
using a number of directives that affect the verification run; a complete list of
the compilation directives is in Appendix E.
Many of the compilation directives must be used in conjunction with specific
verifier run-time options. Table 4.3 briefly summarizes the verification
options.
Option Description
a Search for acceptance cycles.
b Use backward single-bit hashing.
cN Halts a verification run upon reaching the
N*
error.
d Prints all of the information in the state tables.
e Saves state trails for all encountered errors.
f Enforces weak-faimess.
hN Allows a user to choose a list of hash functions numbering 1 to 32.
i Search for the shortest error trail.
I Faster and approximate search for the shortest error trail.
1 Search for non-progress cycles.
mN Sets the maximum search depth to N.
n Disables the listing of unreachable states.
q Enforces the requirement of empty channels in valid end-states.
s Uses forward single-bit hashing.
V Prints the current version of the tool being used.
wN Sets the size of the hash table to 2N.
Table 4.3: Verification options for SPIN.
The default verification run is an exhaustive search of the state space with
partial-order reduction. In the example below, the verification model of the
.Alternating-Bit Protocol illustrates how to search for deadlock.
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Example.
$gcc -o pan -DMEMCNT=25 -DSAFETY -DNOCLAIM -DVAR_RANGES
-DNOFAIR pan.c
$pan -m6000 -wl9 -cl
Full statespace search for:
never-claim - (not selected)
assertion violations +
cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY)
invalid endstates +
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 5019, errors: 0
29341 states, stored
29001 states, matched
58342 transitions (= stored+matched)
22486 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 17565 (resolved)
(max size 2^19 states)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes) :
1.643 equivalent memory usage for states
(stored* (State-vector + overhead) )
compressed State-vector=37 byte + 8 byte overhead
1.311 actual memory usage for states (compression:79 .78%)
2.097 +memory used for hash-table (-wl9)
0.168 +memory used for DFS stack (-m6000)
0.221 +memory used for other data structures
3.699 =total actual memory usage
unreached in proctype SenderReceiver
line 37, state 37, "-end-"
(1 of 37 states)
unreached in proctype : init :
(0 of 4 states)
Values assigned within interval
SenderReceiver :msgln
SenderReceiver : clock
SenderReceiver : ackOut
SenderReceiver : controlOut
SenderReceiver : ackln
SenderReceiver : controlln
SenderReceiver : first
[0. .255]
0-2,
0-7,
0-1,
0-1,
0-1,
0-1,
0-1,
The directive, MEMCJNT=2.\ sets the upper-bound of allowable memory that
the verifier can use at I25, or 32 megabytes of RAM. It is very important
especially on systems with virtual memory to confine this upper-limit to the
available real memory. Otherwise, paging could cause the length of the
verification run to become unacceptable. The SAFETY directive indicates a
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search for invalid end-states during system execution. NOCLAIM, simply tells
the verifier to ignore temporal claims. I rAR_RANGES, computes the values
of all variables within the range of 0 to 255. Finally, NOFAIR disables the
code for weak-fairness, which shortens the verification run.
The first section of output provides feedback on the properties examined by
the verifier. The next two sections show the size of the system both in terms
of states and transitions, and actual memory needed to perform the
verification. The last two sections provide extra information not pertaining to
safety properties.
By default, unreachable code is reported after every verification run. This helps
expose over-specified systems and possible missing functionality. The variable
ranges shown were explicitly requested; these can help spot problems when the
bounds of variables are known during system design.
Memory is often the limiting factor in model checking. In this example the
state vector is 48 bytes, and comprises all of the channels and variables that
contribute to the global state of the system. The verifier automatically
compressed this value to 37 bytes, reducing the total memory required to store
states by 20%. If the automatic compression scheme does not utilize memory
efficiently enough, then the COLLAPSE compilation directive should be used.
Using this directive reduces the memory requirements by 60%, compared with
no compression at all. The cost for the memory savings, however, is two to
three times more run-time.
Most memory is used in the verification run for the hash table that tracks the
visited states. The hash table size is set by the ;; run-time option, which
estimates the state space size. In exhaustive verification runs its importance is
diminished because all collisions in the hash table are resolved by using linked-
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lists; this is not the case when performing a bit-state space analysis. The
memory required for the stack and data structures is very small compared to
the hash table, but the size of the stack should be kept to a minimum to allow
for a larger hash table and more states. A series of trial verification runs must
be performed to achieve this.
The following example shows the memory requirements after explicitly
disabling partial-order reduction.
Example.
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 58329, errors: 0
576345 states, stored
73 6707 states, matched
1.31305e+06 transitions (= stored+matched)
442552 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 1.16174e+06 (resolved)
(max size 2"19 states)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes) :
29.970 equivalent memory usage for states
(stored* (State-vector + overhead))
compressed State-vector=3 6 byte + 4 byte overhead
23.12 actual memory usage for states (compression: 77 . 17%)
2.097 +memory used for hash-table (-wl9)
1.440 +memory used for DFS stack (-m60000)
0.422 +memory used for other data structures
2 6.9 87 =total actual memory usage
Notice that the state space is over 22 times larger than it was when the partial-
order reduction algorithm was applied, which in turn increased memory
requirements more than 7 times.
One more use of verification will be explained: bit-state space analysis. Again,
the same .Alternating-Bit Protocol is used for the example. This is not the best
specification for this type of analysis, because bit-state analysis is usually applied
to systems that cannot be verified exhaustively. However, the example does
show memory requirements and coverage of the bit-state space approach.
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Example.
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 4979, errors: 0
26931 states, stored
26843 states, matched
53774 transitions (= stored+matched)
20681 atomic steps
hash factor: 155.737
(expected coverage: :>= 99.9% on avg.)
(max size 2^22 states)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes) :
1.400 equivalent memory usage for states
(stored* (State-vector + overhead))
0.524 memory used for hash-array (-w22)
0.160 +memory used for DFS stack (-m5000)
0.221 +memory used for other data structures
1.413 =total actual memory usage
For a bit-state space analysis, it is very important for the hash factor to be
greater than 100 to ensure the best coverage of the state space. The hash
factor is the ratio of the size of the hash table to the number of states stored.
The COVEST compilation directive gives an estimate of the coverage in
percentagesbut it is only an estimate. Here the memory savings are not
substantial, however, the savings can be enormous when verifying larger
systems.
It is not always possible to perform a bit-state space analysis. Most of the
literature about bit-state analysis indicates that, at the expense of coverage, one
can always be performed. However, if there is not enough memory to store
the data structures, search stack, and hash table, then the bit-state space
approach will not work.
The table
below'
summarizes the six verification runs for the .Alternating-Bit
Protocol. The complete PROMELA specification for this model can be found
in Appendix I.
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Type of
Analysis
Run-Time Option
COLLAPSE
Used Partial-
Order Reduction
Actual Memory-
Used in MB
Exhaustive N Y 3.699
Exhaustive Y Y 3.084
Exhaustive N N 26.987
Exhaustive Y N 11.969
Supertrace N/A Y 1.413
Supertrace N/A N 9.896
Table 4.4: Verification runs of the AB Protocol.
For exhaustive verification, partial-order reduction has a tremendous impact on
memory requirements. The difference is almost an order of magnitude for the
system used in this example. The reason is the way channels are used in the
model. It is very important to try to place exclusive access restrictions on
channels when possible to gain the full benefit of partial-order reduction.
The bit-state space analysis with partial-order reduction uses the least amount
of memory. For a small system like this one, it is very easy to get the hash
factor over 100 producing a coverage estimate of over 99.9%. With larger
systems and limited resources, it becomes harder to achieve such coverage.
For this situation, different techniques can be used to increase confidence in
the model. For example, the SPIN verifier is equipped with both forward and
backward single-bit hash functions, as well as the ability to use thirty-two
different hash functions. This still does not guarantee total coverage, but sixty-
four verification runs with independent hash functions is as close as any tool
can get without performing an exhaustive search.
4.3 The Graphical User Interface XSPIN
XSPIN greatly simplifies the task of learning the tool: It allows the user to
utilize all of the functionality of SPIN, while extending its output capabilities.
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The extra capabilities include graphical representations of the processes in the
system as state machines, and graphical representations of message exchanges
in the form of message sequence charts. It also provides different forms of
text output that help to understand the system.
Upon starting XSPIN, the main control window appears. The window has
two basic functions: (1) as an editor for the current PROMELA specification,
and (2) as an interface to functionality not provided by SPIN. The File burton
performs the same basic operations that would be found in any application
with a GUI. The Help button provides limited advice for the other available
functions. The rest of the buttons Simulate, Verify, LTL, and FSM View
create windows that will be explained below.
The Simulate button produces a window that prompts for simulation options.
This includes what to display during the run, the type of simulation to run, and
how to handle full channels. There are only two ways to handle sending
messages to a full channel: block messages or loose messages. The simulation
type can be any of the three mentioned previously interactive, guided, or
random.
There are four display options. The Execution Bar Panel produces a window
with a bar graph showing (in real-time) the percentage of statement executions
belonging to each process. The loanable Values Panel traces the values of all of
the variables in the specification. The Time Sequence Panel shows the interleaved
sequence of statement executions in text form. Finally, the Message Sequence
Chart shows the sequential ordering of events taking place on system channels.
This is a valuable tool when trying to understand communication between
processes.
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The Verify button creates a window that prompts the user for verification
options. For verification runs, XSPIN and SPIN differ only in look, not
content.
The LTL button produces a window that is an interface to the LTL Translator.
The interface provides additional features: It can automatically negate a formula
when it is a desired property instead of an undesired one. It can also
automatically import the generated never claim directly into the current
specification in the main control window.
Fin-ally, pressing the FSM I lew button creates a window with -all process names
contained in the specification. Double clicking on a name creates a window
with the graphical representation of the
process'finite state machine. This is
useful in understanding the construction and operation of individual processes.
4.4 Comments and Conclusions
The simulator provides a great deal of feedback about the system in a relatively
short period of time. Its three modes of operation guided, interactive, -and
random give the user a robust and adaptable simulation environment. The
graphical information produced by XSPIN makes the large amount of
simulation output easier to work with. This in turn reduces the time required
to perform simulations.
The verifier takes time to learn, and here XSPIN is not much help. There are
three basic issues when using the verifier: (1) the user must determine the correct
options to use, (2) the user must ensure that these options do not conflict with
one another, and (3) the user must understand the verifier enough to use the
best options for a particular run. Needless to say, this requires experience with
the tool.
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Even an experienced user finds it somewhat difficult to perform verifications
of larger systems in the face of limited resources. The tool addresses this by
offering different verification options, but using these require many extensive
trials. The fact that specifications consuming many system resources usually
take much longer to complete further limits the usefulness of these options.
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Chapter 5
HOW SPIN WORKS
5.0 Introduction
SPIN was identified in Chapter 1 as an on-the-fly verifier; this chapter tells
what that means. As noted previously, SPIN is both a simulator and a verifier.
.Although the simulator and verifier are distinct, they both perform their tasks
on-the-fly.
The next section presents the simulator as a PROMELA interpreter. Because
this thesis is more concerned with SPIN as a validation tool, only basic
simulator functions are investigated.
The simulator discussion is followed by -an overview of the verifier, which
explores the three different search methods in the tool: a fully exhaustive
search, an exhaustive search with partial-order reduction, and a bit-state space
analysis. A single section suffices because all three approaches use the same
basic algorithm. A bit-state space analysis, for example, is an exhaustive search
that records minimal amounts of information about visited states.
How the verifier handles correctness claims is presented in Section 5.3.
Assertions and end-state labels do not require an extended version depth-first
search algorithm presented in Section 5.2, however, the inclusion of progress-
state labels, accept-state labels, and temporal claims require a nested depth-first
search algorithm.
The last section presents comments and conclusions.
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5.1 An Overview of the Simulator
This section introduces the basic structure of the simulator. The simulator
interprets both complete and incomplete specifications, an invaluable service
when constructing new designs and debugging old ones.
SPIN is an acronym for Simple PROMELA Interpreter. SPIN is used as a
simulator primarily to provide a better understanding of the specification, and
to find the causes of errors discovered by the verifier. Evaluating expressions
is at the core of the simulator, and uses the notion of
"executability" discussed
in Chapter 2.1.
The simulator has a lexical analyzer, a parser, and a scheduler. A PROMELA
specification is the input for the lexical analyzer, which breaks the program into
lexical tokens. The tokens are passed to the parser, which constructs a parse-
tree. Finally, the scheduler performs the simulation by traversing the parse-
tree. The simulation proceeds top down by evaluating each node (expression)
in the parse-tree.
For a complete description of the algorithms and functionality, consult the
latest source code or [3] in the References.
5.2 .An Overview of the Verifier
A model checker formally verifies a specification via a reachability analysis of its
state space. SPIN's reachability analysis can take three forms: (1) a completely
exhaustive analysis of the state space, (2) an exhaustive analysis of a subset of
the state space that retains correctness properties, or (3) a bit-state space
analysis called Supertrace. This section describes how the tool performs each
search.
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All three techniques start with the same basic new of the system. They view
each PROMELA specification as a labeled transition system with a finite
number of states and transitions. Every transition has both a precondition and
an effect. The precondition is based on the local state of the process in which
the transition (statement) resides. The effect is the local or global state change
made (if any) as a result of the transition (statement execution).
campte.
1 active proctype example ( ) {
2 chan sr = [1] of { bit } ;
3 do
4 : sr!0
5 : sr!l
6 : sr?0
7 : sr?l
od
}
Unreachable states are unvisited states in the labeled transition system, and fall
into two classes. Unreachable local states refer to unused code in the
specification, which is reported as dead code by the verifier. This dead code is
the result ofmissing functionality or over-specification. If line 5 were removed
from the above example, line 7 would be reported as unreachable code because
the statement would never be executable.
Unreachable global states should include all error states, representing the
undesirable properties specified by the designer. Generally, the number of
unreachable states of a system is much greater than the number of reachable
states. This is fortunate for model checking, as algorithms are already
constrained by the large number of reachable states. Removing line 6 or 7
from the example above would lead to an undesirable deadlock state, which is
currently an unreachable global state.
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The fully exhaustive search is simplest. It provides the greatest coverage of the
state space, but can only be applied to very small problems due to the number
of states that it must explore. Exhaustive analysis is done by a depth-first
search of the state space.
procedure dfs (state)
if state is an error
then report error and exit
add state to state_table
add state to state_stack
for each successor child_state of state
if child_state is not in state_table
then df s (child_state)
delete state from state_stack
end
Figure 5.1: Basic depth-first search algorithm [8].
The algorithm starts by calling the depth-first search procedure with the initial
system state. The state passed in is checked for errors; if it is not an error
state, then it is added to a hash table that tracks all visited states. It is also
pushed onto the search stack that contains all of the states visited in the
current pass of the depth-first search. Finally, the depth-first search procedure
is called recursively for each successor to the current state.
There are two data structures used in the above algorithm, a stack and a table.
The stack, in this algorithm, is only used to show counter-examples. When a
state has no successors (the bottom is reached), states are popped from the
stack and the algorithm backtracks to a previously visited state with an
unvisited successor state.
The table records visited states, and it is organized in memory as a hash table
of linked lists. Linked lists house all visited states, and they are used within the
hash table to resolve any hash collisions.
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The full search method performs more work than is necessary by exploring
sequences of states that do not need to be explored. Consequendy, it places
inflated demands on storage requirements by storing impertinent information.
Partial-order reduction methods avoid exploring redundant interleavings by
reducing them to a single statement sequence.
Redundant interleavings are statement sequences proven capable of being
represented by a single statement sequence. Therefore, ifmultiple interleavings
can be interchanged without affecting correctness properties, it is sufficient to
explore only one of them. Partial-order reduction reduces the total number of
states to be explored, and is analogous to the use of atomic sequences to
reduce the number of possible interleavings discussed in Chapter 3. The
difference is that this concept is now applied across processes, instead of being
restricted to the statements of a single process.
Example.
byte globalVar;
active proctype Processl( ) {
byte localVarl;
localVarl++; /* 1 */
globalVar = globalVar +1 /* 2 */
}
active proctype Process2 ( ) {
byte localVar2;
localVar2++; /* 3 */
globalVar = globalVar - 1
}
/* 4 */
In the example above, there are two statements in each process, requiring six
different execution sequences to fully explore the state space. The set of
statement interleavings is { (1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 3, 2, 4), (1, 3, 4, 2), (3, 4, 1, 2), (3, 4,
1, 2), (3, 1, 4, 2), (3, 1, 2, 4) }. Because statements 1 and 3 access local
variables, only two interleavings must be explored that switch statements 2 and
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4. The statement sequences (1, 2, 3, 4) and (3, 4, 1, 2), for example, would be
sufficient.
Partial-order reduction of the state space can be performed dynamically during
the search, or statically before the search. Dynamic reduction strategies require
additional memory and CPU time, and because this occurs during the
verification run, when system resources are already in high demand, the
benefits of performing the reduction may be limited. For this reason, SPIN
uses a static reduction strategy.
The static reduction method that SPIN uses follows the notion of statement
independence mentioned earlier. Two statements are independent if and only if
the following conditions are met [5]:
1. They are both enabled.
AND
2. The execution of either cannot disable the other.
AND
3. The effect of execution is indistinguishable of the order.
Two statements are globally independent if and only if the following condition is
met
1. They reside in different processes and access only local objects.
The criteria above for statement independence are not sufficient in the
presence of a temporal claim if the effects of the statements are observable to
the claim. Consequently, the reduction criteria can make the temporal claim
incapable of being violated when it should, allowing an error to go undetected.
Solving this requires that only one statement in the sequence is observable to
the temporal claim or capable of changing state.
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With the above conditions in mind, five statements can be statically marked as
either conditionally or unconditionally safe:
1 . exclusive send statements
2. exclusive receive statements
3. nfull statements
4. nempty statements
5. any strictly local statement (accesses only local objects)
An unconditionally safe statement cannot be a guard in a control flow mechanism,
whereas a conditionally safe statement must be a guard in a control flow
mechanism. Consequendy, a conditionally safe statement, based on its
executability, chooses the statement sequence that follows it; an
unconditionally safe statement does not.
Before verification, the processes are reordered to optimize the statically
marked statements. Executing conditionally safe statements first minimizes the
state space because they dynamically choose statement sequences to follow.
Unconditionally safe statements and unsafe statements are executed last. For a
complete description of the partial-order reduction algorithm used by SPIN,
see [5] and [8].
The final method of validation that SPIN performs is a bit-state space analysis
(a.k.a. Supertrace). Supertrace can be thought of as an exhaustive search that does
not resolve any hash conflicts: The linked-lists are dropped. Consequently, it
cannot guarantee correctness, and is not intended for systems that can be
verified by the methods mentioned previously.
Because Supertrace uses the same basic algorithm for state space exploration as
above, partial-order reduction also applies here. The effects of partial-order
reduction are twofold: The state space that is explored is reduced, and this in
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turn increases the coverage of the analysis. The coverage of Supertrace is
estimated as the hash factor (see Chapter 4.2).
Each table entry contains a single bit of information: A table entry of 0
indicates that the state has not been visited, while a table entry of 1 indicates
that the state may have been visited. Collisions occur when a state is hashed
into the table where the bit is already 1. Consequently, the current state must
be treated as if it were previously visited, introducing an unknown amount of
uncertainty.
The uncertainty of Supertrace is unknown due to the many consequences of
hash collisions. A hash collision, for example, will make an unvisited state be
treated as one visited. This in turn may an unvisited successor of the
unvisited state to go unexplored; this depends on the connectivity of the state
graph, and is why SPIN can only estimate coverage.
5.3 Verifying Correctness Properties
Three types of correctness claims that can be made in PROMELA tike the
form of assertions, state-labels, and temporal claims. Assertions are boolean
conditions; either true or false. Because they are evaluated like any other
statement, they do not require any alterations to the algorithms.
Similarly, end-state labels are easily checked by the verifier, and do not require
changes to the depth-first search algorithm to establish their correctness. End-
states are checked for validity when all reachable states have been explored.
An end-state is valid if each process in the system has reached the end of its
code or a labeled end-state.
Checking accept-state labels employs a nested depth-first algorithm to find
acceptance cycles. Acceptance cycles are cyclic sequences of states that contain
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an accept-state label. Figure 5.2 presents the algorithm used to search for
acceptance cycles.
procedure dfs (state)
if state is an error
then report error and exit
add {state, 0} to state_table
add state to state_stack
for each successor child_state of state
if {child_state, 0} is not in state_table
then df s (child_state)
if state is an accepting state
then ndfs (state)
delete state from state_stack
end
procedure ndfs (state)
add {state, 1} to state_table
for each successor child_state of state
if {child_state, 1} is not in state_table
then ndf s (child_state)
else if child_state is in state_stack
then report cycle
end
Figure 5.2: Nested depth-first search algorithm [8].
The dfs procedure searches for error states until it reaches a state with no
successors, then it backtracks looking for a state with an accept-state label. If
an accept-state label is found in the current pass of the depth-first search, the
ndfs procedure is called with the labeled accept-state and the search for
acceptance cycles begins.
The ndfs procedure looks for any sequence of states that will lead it back to the
accept-state label it started with by re-searching the successor states of the
labeled accept-state. The state_stack is searched for each child_state encountered
in the ndfs: If a child_state is found in the state_stack, an acceptance cycle is
reported.
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The nested depth-first search algorithm performs well, minimally increasing
memory requirements because the second search procedure does not have to
maintain its own stack. The ndfs procedure simply uses the same search stack
as the dfs procedure. Because of redundant searching, the time to complete the
search can double if no acceptance cycles are found, but this increase in run
time will usually not preclude verifications from being performed.
Checking progress-state labels is transformed into a search for acceptance
cycles. A progress state is a state that immediately follows a progress-state
label. Non-progress requires that cyclic statement sequences be reported as
errors if they do not contain a progress state. Cyclic statement sequences
without progress states are considered starvation loops (livelock), because they
may occur infinitely often.
Progress states are considered boolean conditions, which can alter the global
boolean variable progress: progress is true if and only if the current state is labeled
with a progress-state label. This means that a search for non-progress cycles
becomes a search for acceptance cycles by forming a temporal claim of the
boolean condition progress.
Example.
never { /*<>[] Iprogress */
T0_init: if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
:: (! ((progress))) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
accept_S2 : if
:: (! ((progress))) -> goto T0_S2
fi;
T0_S2 : if
:: (! ((progress))) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
accept_all: skip
}
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The temporal claim is Od^progress, and is automatically generated by SPIN
when a search for non-progress cycles is performed. The LTL formula
OUhprogress means that progress cannot remain false indefinitely. The temporal
claim in the above example illustrates the implicit claim generated by SPIN.
Temporal claims are easy to implement, although they have the potential to
greatly increase memory requirements and run-time. The current condition
(statement) of the temporal claim is checked after each transition of the system
to a new state. A match in conditions of a temporal claim results in a test for
acceptance cycles due to stuttering semantics; this is discussed in Chapter 2.4.
If no acceptance cycle is encountered, the claim cannot be matched. The
possible increase in memory due to a temporal claim is the system state space
multiplied by the number ofmatched states of the temporal claim.
5.4 Comments and Conclusions
Using the simulator is not necessary to perform verifications, however, it is
extremely helpful when trying to understand the behavior of a model. Added
functionality, like simulators, greatly improves the chances of formal methods
being accepted and used in the future. Without the simulator, SPIN would fall
short as a formal verification tool.
The on-the-fly method of model checking verifies correctness properties while
the state space of the model is explored in a single pass. This eliminates the
need to construct and store the entire state space so that a check of correctness
properties can be performed in a second pass. Adding partial-order reduction
and compression to on-the-fly model checking, which SPIN does, ensures that
the applicability of SPIN is bound to grow.
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Chapter 6
THE COMMIT PROTOCOL
6.0 Introduction
Transaction processing in distributed databases is a difficult problem from
both the data consistency and performance perspectives. Data consistency
requires that a transaction be processed without interference from any other
transactions in the distributed system. Performance in transaction processing
systems is measured by the time required to successfully complete a
transaction.
Both of these concerns have been addressed in many different ways. The most
profound differences in approach lie in the locking mechanisms, which provide
exclusive access to data during updates. One method of locking data places
most of the burden on the clients. Each client, upon forming a transaction,
must locate and lock the resources it requires before any changes are made,
thus ensuring exclusive access until the transaction is complete. After all of the
locks are acquired, changes are made and the resources released. Without some
preemption mechanism, there is no upper bound on the length of time a client
is allowed to hold resources, which could degrade performance considerably.
Implementing this preemption mechanism will undoubtedly increase network
traffic due to the fact that clients must now communicate with each other
while competing for resources.
Another method places most of the burden of performing transactions on the
servers. In this scheme, a client just sends each transaction to a server to be
processed and awaits an acknowledgment. The request contains all of the
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information necessary to complete the transaction, and is usually based on
replicated data with some versioning or timestamp mechanism to keep the data
consistent. After receiving the transaction, the server locks all of the necessary
resources to perform the updates. If all of the locks can be put in place and all
versions are consistent, then the updates are made and the transaction is
completed. If not, then the transaction is aborted and the client may retry by
making another request. This allows the server to perform transactions
atomically, guaranteeing consistency.
The designs above represent trade-offs between ease of maintaining
consistency, and ease of maintaining performance. In the first method,
performance depends on the preemption mechanism. The overhead of this
preemption mechanism, and any associated priority scheme, inevitably causes a
loss in performance. In the second method, data consistency depends on the
replication of data and versioning. This method is based on an assumption
that in a very large database, the contention for resources will be minimal.
When the assumption holds, this method is very efficient. When the
assumption does not hold, a considerable amount of overhead is incurred by
updating copies of data in the system and retrying transactions.
The Commit Protocol uses the second method described above. This chapter
is a tutorial on the formal verification of the Commit Protocol using
PROMELA/SPIN. Because it is a tutorial, it attempts to encompass as much
pertinent material as possible in a start-to-finish fashion. The verification
process, however, is a trial-and-error process much of the time. Consequently,
only the more important problems encountered during the verification of this
protocol are addressed.
The next section presents an informal specification of the protocol. Sections
6.2 and 6.3 explain the process of building a formal model that is capable of
77
verification within the available
resources.1Section 6.4 discusses the
PROMELA implementation of the final version of the Commit Protocol
specification. The final section presents comments and conclusions.
6.1 The Informal Specification
The Commit Protocol [2] is classified as an all-or-nothing protocol because it
either completes or aborts an entire transaction. For this reason, it must
operate in two phases. The first phase makes sure that the necessary resources
are available and then locks them. If the first phase is successful, then the
second phase performs the updates and releases the resources. If the first
phase is not successful, then the second phase aborts by notifying the client
and the involved servers that the transaction must be aborted. Regardless of
whether or not a transaction is completed or aborted, it must go through two
phases.
Coordinator
CanCommit
Worker
Ask Workers to
commit
Send answer to
Coordinator
w
Can/Cant
'
DoCommit/Abort
Commit if all
can, else abort
Commit and
confirm or abort
HaveCommited
Update Client
Figure 6.1: Normal operation of the Commit Protocol.
1 All verifications of the Commit Protocol in this chapter were performed ou HP Mode] 715
workstations running at 100MHz, and containing 128 MB of RAM.
: See Appendix J for the complete PROMELA specification of the Commit ProtocoL
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A sequence of events for the Commit Protocol, in the absence of any faults, is
shown in Figure 6.1. It displays the normal operation of the coordinator and
worker(s) involved in a transaction. Although the figure only shows one
worker, there can be any number of workers involved throughout the network
with any single coordinator. The first phase of the protocol includes the first
two arrows in the figure, and the second includes the last two.
Although a client may need the resources of more than one server in the
network, it is not concerned with locating them. A client-only has to choose a
server that holds at least one of the resources in the current transaction, and
send that server the transaction request. The server that receives the request
from the client becomes the coordinator for that transaction.
Upon receiving a new request, the coordinator starts the first phase of the
protocol. The first action is to ensure that any resources that it must
contribute to the current transaction are available. If one or more resources
required by the coordinator cannot be acquired, then the transaction cannot be
completed. The coordinator then notifies the client that the transaction was
aborted without involving any other servers.
If all of the resources at the coordinator can be acquired, then they are locked
for the remainder of the transaction. The coordinator then asks the other
servers (workers) holding needed resources if those resources are available by
sending each of them a CanCommit message. If a worker can commit the
resources, it locks them and returns a Can message to the coordinator. If a
worker cannot commit all of the resources needed in the transaction, then it
returns a Cant message to the coordinator. When all votes are in from all
workers, the coordinator starts the second phase of the protocol.
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The events of the second phase are determined by the votes received by the
workers in the first phase. If no Cant messages were received, the coordinator
notifies all workers to make the necessary updates by sending each of them a
DoCommit message. The coordinator, at this time, also performs an update on
the resources that it has locked for the current transaction. If a Cant message
was received from any worker, then the coordinator tells all workers to abort
the current transaction by sending them an Abort message. In addition, the
coordinator releases any resources that it is holding for the current transaction
without updating them. After the workers receive either a DoCommit or an
Abort message, they release all resources involved in that transaction. If the
workers receive Abort messages, no acknowledgement is sent; however, they
receive a DoCommit message, they send the coordinator a HareCommited
message. Upon receiving the acknowledgement, the coordinator notifies the
client of the transaction's status.
It should be noted that error-free communication is assumed here. If this were
not the case, a number of extensions would have to be made to the operation
of the protocol shown in Figure 6.1. Consequently, the coordinator would
have to provide timeout mechanisms for any expected replies, and a decision
making ability for either retrying or aborting a transaction. Similarly, this
scheme does not provide protection from server failures. Even this simplified
version, however, is more difficult to verify than it might appear.
6.2 Building the Model
The last section described the Commit Protocol's operational behavior.
However, before building a model that can be submitted for verification, a
structural representation must be decided upon. It is this structure that is used
as a guide to form process definitions and the methods of communication
between them. Each process is a partial behavioral representation of the
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system that can be used to group non-conflicting operations that take place
sequentially. Keeping in mind that the size of the state space is the limiting
factor during verification, and the protocol specifies that the coordinator also
acts as a worker, a very conservative structural representation is possible.
Because a coordinator must perform tasks as both a coordinator and a worker,
there is no need to specify them separately. Therefore, it should be sufficient
to define just two processes. The Client process generates transactions for the
coordinators. The Coordinator process represents servers in the network.
Client
A L iL
i r
fe
*<r
Coordinator/Worker Coordinator/Worker
w
Server #1 Server #2
Figure 6.2: Initial structural representation.
With only two process definitions, the protocol should be easily verifiable with
a modest amount of system resources. This representation is sufficient to
create contention for resources and to show the protocol is sound. In the
system above, there are two coordinators, two workers, and one client. Each
server houses two resources. Communications channels are set up between
the client and both coordinators for transaction requests and
acknowledgements. Communications channels are also set up between the
coordinators and workers. Figure 6.2 illustrates this structure.
This structural representation is very conservative, requiring only three
instantiated processes and six channels. For a number of reasons, however, it
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cannot be verified. Also, the structure is over-simplified. Consequently, the
model does not fully satisfy the informal specification given in the first section.
The first problem encountered during the verification process concerned the
use of atomic sequences. An atomic sequence was placed in the model that
contained a loop. The loop contained a non-deterministic choice of
assignment statements, and was thought to eventually force a jump to a
location outside of the atomic sequence. Even though the loop represented a
finite number of states, the atomic statement made it seem like an infinite loop
to the verifier.
Example.
Inf initeLoop:
atomic {
goto Inf initeLoop
};
FiniteLoop:
atomic {...};
goto FiniteLoop;
The example above illustrates the infinite loop problem. Although the goto
statements appear to jump outside of the atomic sequence, they are actually
jumping to the first statement inside the atomic sequences. This caused the
depth-first search stack to grow to capacity and terminate the search. This
problem was fixed by placing the goto statement that closed the loop outside
of the atomic sequence.
A second and unrelated problem concerned the use of compilation directives.
Because it seemed that the state space was too large for the available memory,
the REACJT directive was used. This directive should guarantee, in a search
truncated by memory constraints, the validity of the search up to the point of
termination. When used with exhaustive searches, however, the verification
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run never ends. For example, an exhaustive verification run was performed
using this directive, and ran for 40 hours without exhausting memory or
completing.
The most difficult problem encountered was the inability to verify the model
due to memory constraints. Because the model is very small and simple, this
was unexpected. It is conjectured that the instantiation of two Coordinator
processes was to blame. The theory is that a process definition that tikes
channels as parameters cannot have multiple instantiations without invalidating
the partial-order reduction on those channels. In correspondence with
Holzmann, he discounted this theory, but had no other explanation to offer.
System resource problems aside, the model does not satisfy the requirements
for the protocol. The use of only two workers in the system is insufficient for
modeling the voting phase of the protocol when one of the workers is
embedded in the coordinator. The voting phase is over-simplified in the
model to the point that it becomes trivial.
If the coordinator can acquire its resources, it sends a CanCommit message to
the other worker in the system. In the event that the worker cannot commit, it
aborts the transaction and alerts the coordinator. At this point, all servers
involved in the transaction know that the transaction was aborted. Therefore,
there is never a need for the coordinator to send an Abort message to any
workers. The statement that sends the Abort message is reported as
unreachable code during verification.
This requires that the model be extended to include at least one more worker.
The inclusion of this extra worker forces the coordinator to store information
pertaining to the voting process for each transaction. Because the model, in its
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current state, is unverifiable, it seems that the added complexity of storing
information will make this problem much worsethis is not the case.
6.3 Refining the Model
The design from the last section does not have to be completely abandoned.
By making changes incrementally, the effects of the changes can be studied and
understood. Even though each change is made individually, a new structural
representation should be constructed and used as a goal in each step ot the
revision process.
Client
i i.
^ r
^
Coordinator/Worker Worker
w
Server #1 Server #2
Figure 6.3: Revised structural representation.
The changes made to the model in Figure 6.3 are minor, however, they have an
enormous impact on the verification process. Only one change was made to
the client It now communicates with just one coordinator process. The
process that acts as both a coordinator and a worker did not have to be
changed at all. A new Worker process definition was created using the
Coordinator process definition as a template. For the new process definition,
however, all functions pertaining to the coordinator were removed. This
makes it strictly a worker process.
There are now three process definitions in the model, and only one process is
instantiated for each definition during verification. The specification of the
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revised model can now be verified without exhausting system resources. In
fact, the model went from being unverifiable using over 200 MB ofmemory to
being verifiable using about 25 MB of memory (both attempts used the
compression compilation option).
There are two explanations for the reduction in the state space. The first
explanation, discussed previously, asserts that multiple instantiations of a
process with channel parameters invalidates the partial-order reduction on
those channels. If this is true, it may be just a bug in the verifier.
The other explanation is that the elimination of one coordinator in the system
reduced the complexity of the model. Although the reduction in the state
space was dramatic, this is possible. Applying the input space to two
coordinators causes an interleaving of two 25 MB state spaces. Determining
conclusively which explanation is correct would require enough memory to run
tests that could pinpoint the problem.
Client
t WorkerOJ ii r i> Server #2
j
Coordinator/Worker
^
Workerl !^
w
^
Server #3Server #1
Figure 6.4: Final structural representation.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the changes made to the structure of the model to meet
the requirements of the protocol. The addition of another worker in the
system makes it necessary to store extra transaction information in the
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coordinator, because no assumption can be made about the time each worker
will take to process a transaction. This gives the coordinator the ability to send
an Abort message to one worker when it receives an Abort message from the
other worker.
Four processes are instantiated and six channels are used for communication
during verification of the model. This configuration was verified for safety using
85 MB of memory. A verification for safety proves the absence of deadlock in
the model by checking for any invalid end-states. It was also verified for liveness
using just under 100 MB of memory. A verification for liveness proves the
absence of livelock in the model by checking non-progress cycles.
The original specification that was unverifiable consisted of about 175 lines of
PROMELA code. The final version of the Commit Protocol specification
consists of over 400 lines ofPROMELA code. This shows that the complexity
of the model is not always proportional to the size of its PROMELA program.
6.4 The Final Version
This section discusses the PROMELA specification, corresponding to Figure
6.4, at the code level. Appendix J contains the complete specification of the
Two-Phase Commit Protocol.
The first 23 lines of the program define constants, data types, and
communication channels to be used throughout the model. The mtype
declaration on lines 13 and 14 contains nine message types. The six types of
messages exchanged between the coordinator and workers are: CanCommit, Can,
Cant, Abort, DoCommit, and HaveCommited. The three types of messages
exchanged between the client and coordinator are: NewTrans, Commited, and
Aborted. These message types are used for conditional receives throughout the
model and represent the first field of a message.
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Coordinator WorkerO Workerl Transaction
ID
RO Rl RO Rl RO Rl
Figure 6.5: Message format a 7-bit one-dimensional array.
In five out of the six channels, the second message field is represented by the
structure, message. It contains an array of seven bits. The first six bits identify
the requested resources for the transaction, while the last bit is the transaction
identification number. This is illustrated above in Figure 6.5. For the first six
bits, a 1 indicates a request for that resource. The transaction ID can have the
value 0 or 1, consequently there can be no more than two transactions in the
system concurrendy.
The Client process (lines 24-68) continually loops through an escape sequence.
This is done to give preference to messages coming from the coordinator. If
there are no messages from the coordinator and there are less than two
transactions in the system, the client attempts to send a transaction request.
The client will not always be successful in doing this because in order for a
transaction to be sent, it must request at least one resource from each server.
This constrains the input space to the more meaningful transactions while
reducing the state space of the model.
An atomic sequence is used to protect the local information in the Client
process pertaining to outstanding transactions. This is done to prevent the
escape sequence from changing control before line 55 can be reached and the
new transaction sent. Otherwise, deadlock would eventually occur because the
client would think that the transactions were sent and would await status
information that would never arrive.
The Coor-dinator process (lines 69-270) is the largest and most complex process
definition in the specification. Most of this can be attributed to the dual
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function the coordinator performs; both as a coordinator and as a worker.
Some of this complexity is also results from the need to communicate with the
client and workers.
The main loop (lines 77-120) of this process also uses an escape sequence. The
escape sequence is used here to give preference to transactions already in the
system by handling messages from workers first. However, if a new
transaction is accepted from the client, the coordinator's processing of the new
transaction cannot be preempted by a message from a worker. Preferences
aside, the coordinator can take any message type at any time, by using
transaction identification numbers and a local memory to coordinate events.
Transaction 0 Transaction 1
r "N r ^N
wo
Voted?
Wl
Voted?
WO
Abort?
Wl
Abort?
wo
Voted?
Wl
Voted?
WO
Abort?
Wl
Abort?
Figure 6.6: Voting information array /-wter.
The coordinator stores information to keep track of votes and resources. An
array of eight bits is used to house voting information for the transactions in
the system. The format for the information in the array is shown in the Figure
6.6 above. If any of the questions in the figure can be answered with a yes, a 1
is placed in that location in the array. Otherwise, the value in that location
remains a 0. The information can be accessed when needed to coordinate
events within the coordinator.
RO Locked? By Transaction 0? By Transaction 1 ?
Rl Locked? By Transaction 0? By Transaction 1 ?
Figure 6.7: lesource information array idataTable.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the information stored to lock resources. Two bits of
storage information would be sufficient for each resource, however, three bits
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were used for two reasons. First, control flow is easier to implement. Second,
this makes it much easier to compose a temporal claim that can monitor
exclusive access to the resources.
There are two transaction processing functions in the Coordinator process
definition COHandlel and C0Handle2. COHandiel (lines 121-158) processes
new transaction requests from the client. It first checks for the availability of
the requested resources in the server that encompasses the coordinator. If all
of the resources are available, locks are placed on them and the workers are
sent CanCommit messages. If one or more of the requested resources are
unavailable, the client is notified that the transaction was aborted.
Before the locks are implemented, assert statements ensure that the lock was
not set by another transaction (see lines 136 and 144). This eliminates the need
to use a temporal claim to monitor exclusive access to resources which reduces
the memory requirements to verify the model.
C0HandIe2 (lines 159-269) processes all messages sent by workers. It uses the
stored voting information discussed earlier and two bits that indicate the
current phase of a transaction to process messages. If the transaction is in the
first phase and all voting information is acquired, then either DoCommit or
Abort messages are sent to the appropriate workers in the system as required by
the protocol. The client will also be notified at this time with an Aborted
message if the transaction was aborted. If the transaction is in the second
phase of the protocol, then once all commits have been acknowledged, the
client is notified that the transaction has been committed.
The worker processes, WO and W1 (lines 273-350 and 351-427, respectively),
are functionally equivalent. They are very simple because they need to process
only three different types of messages from the coordinator. If a CanCommit
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message is received, the worker uses the same method of locking and resource
information storage as the Coordinator process definition. The only difference
here is that the worker immediately responds to the coordinator with a
message that indicates its ability to carry out the transaction.
If the worker receives a DoCommit or Abort message from the coordinator,
the actions taken are almost exactly the same. Because this model is an
abstraction of the protocol, no real data is used and no real updates tike place.
Therefore, the reception of either of these two messages simply indicates that
the worker should release all locks on resources pertaining to the current
transaction. The difference between the handling of the two messages above is
that a HaveCommitedmessage must be sent to the coordinator if the transaction
was committed.
The next section examines the verification process of the Commit protocol
specification discussed above. This focuses on two parameters: memory
requirements and run-time.
6.5 Comments and Conclusions
The specification in Appendix J was verified for both safety and liveness
properties. During the revision process, it was necessary at times to allow the
verifications to use part of virtual memory. This caused a significant increase in
run-time, and is not recommended. However, it sometimes is the only way to
verify the model.
The following example illustrates the commands, compilation directives, and
partial results of a verification run for safety properties for the Commit
Protocol specification. Explanations for all options and directives can be
found in the Appendix. The important directive to notice here is
COLLAPSE. It invokes a compression algorithm that reduces the required
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memory needed for state storage to 16.43% of the original. This saves about
283 MB of memory for state storage and 75 MB for the stack, making it
possible to verify the specification on the given system.
Example:
$spin -a Commit. pml
$gcc -o pan -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DMEMCNT=27 -DSAFETY
-DNOCLAIM -DNOFAIR -DCOLLAPSE pan.c
$time ./pan -m800000 -wl9 -cl
State-vector 132 byte, depth reached 718303, errors: 0
2.34512e+06 states, stored
3.39051e+06 states, matched
5.73562e+06 transitions (= stored+matched)
2.00228e+07 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 8.25798e+06 (resolved)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes) :
337.697 equivalent memory usage for states
(stored* (State-vector + overhead))
compressed State-vector=12 byte+12 byte overhead
55.471 memory usage for states (compression: 16.43%)
2.097 +memory used for hash-table (-wl9)
22.400 +memory used for DFS stack (-m800000)
5.319 +memory used for other data structures
85.220 =total actual memory usage
Notice also that the number of states stored is much less than the number of
states matched. Stored states are states encountered for the first time during
the verification run. Matched states are states encountered during a verification
run that have already been visited and entered into the state table. The
difference in numbers results from the use of atomic sequences in the
specification to reduce complexity. Without the use of atomic sequences, the
number of unique states in the system would be much greater and would
increase the memory requirements for verifying all properties of the system.
This specification requires the use of end-state labels to verify safety properties.
This is due to the fact that the coordinator and workers are continually trying
to receive messages. Therefore, end-state labels are placed at the main loops
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(lines 78, 280, and 351) for each of these processes. This prevents the verifier
from falsely reporting these states as invalid end-states.
Example.
$spin -a Commit. pml
$gcc -o pan -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DMEMCNT=28 -DNP -DNOCLAIM
-DNOFAIR -DCOLLAPSE pan.c
$time ./pan -m800000 -wl9 -1 -cl
State-vector 13 6 byte, depth reached 7 61108, errors: 0
2.87517e+06 states, stored (3.48185e+06 visited)
4.41311e+06 states, matched
7.89496e+06 transitions (= visited+matched)
2.59671e+07 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 1.11732e+07 (resolved)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes) :
425.52 6 equivalent memory usage for states
(stored* (State-vector + overhead))
compressed State-vector=12 byte+12 byte overhead
70.410 memory usage for states (compression: 16.55%)
2.097 +memory used for hash-table (-wl9)
22.400 +memory used for DFS stack (-m800000)
4.410 +memory used for other data structures
99.249 =total actual memory usage
A verification for non-progress is illustrated in the above example; this type of
verification searches for starvation loops. The placement of progress-state
labels should be deferred until the verifier exposes a non-progress cycle. This
avoids inadvertently placing one of these labels in the path of an undesirable
cycle. Placing progress-state labels is more difficult than placing end-state
labels because progress-state labels involve cyclic sequences of the global
system execution, whereas deadlock simply presents a set of blocked
statements for each of the processes in the system.
One progress-state label is placed in the Client process definition at line 31.
This signifies that a loop that encompasses the unless statement in the client
process is making progress. This should be obvious, because the client is
keeping the system going by generating transaction requests. Any other cyclic
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sequences of states occurring infinitely often that involve just the coordinator
and workers would be flagged as an error.
A search for non-progress is actually modeled as a temporal claim under the
hood. For a complete explanation on searching for non-progress cycles, see
Chapter 5. The increase in memory requirements for a verification run of this
type is modest requiring only 15 MB of additional memory.
The cost of the compression algorithm used above is minimal, given that the
alternative is the inability to perform verifications at all. The run-time for
verifying safety properties was approximately 1 6 minutes, and the run-time for
verifying liveness was just under 27 minutes. Holzmann claims that
compression increases the verification run by a factor of 2-3. Due to memory
constraints, however, this could not be confirmed for this specification.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS ON PROMELA/SPIN
The greatest difficulty with learning PROMELA/SPIN is the lack of a single
up-to-date source of information. Holzmann's book, Design and I ralidation of
Computer Protocols, was published in 1991 and has not been updated since. The
problem is compounded by the numerous changes made to PROMELA/SPIN
since the book's publication.
The documentation distributed with the source code attempts to track the
changes made to the language and the tool. The documentation, however, is
scattered throughout many files and is often contradictory. A single
comprehensive source of information that is updated regularly would help
tremendously in learning PROMELA/SPIN faster and using it more
effectively.
After sifting through the documentation and papers to understand the latest
release, it is not difficult to set up and use. Over the course of this thesis,
SPIN was installed and used on four different platforms: a PC running
Microsoft Windows95; a DEC Alpha running Digital Unix; a Sun workstation
running SunOS; and an HP workstation running HP-UX. The installations
were simple, requiring little, if any, modification to the source code and install
scripts.
One can quickly learn PROMELA well enough to start creating simple
specifications within a short time. For more complex or larger specifications,
however, experience with the language is needed. This is especially evident
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when verification runs start exhausting available memory. When this occurs, it
is imperative to use the best possible constructs of the language that incur the
least possible cost with respect to the state space.
Including more data types and functions in PROMELA would make the
modeling process easier, however, SPIN's ability to analyze the resulting
specifications would be compromised: Increasing modeling power usually
decreases analytical power, and vice versa.
PROMELA/SPIN successfully balances the trade-off between modeling power
and analytical power, making it a useful automated verification tool. This is
exemplified by no explicit representation of time. The addition of real-time
would increase state space by at least an order of magnitude for most systems.
Consequendy, PROMELA/SPIN would no longer be a viable formal
verification method because it would only be able to verify very simple systems.
Mastering the ability to create useful specifications is not only a matter of
understanding PROMELA syntax and semantics; it also requires a deep
understanding of the subject matter that is to be modeled. A lack of this
understanding hinders ones ability to create specifications at different levels of
abstraction that accurately represent the design.
Critics maintain that system designers are already overburdened by the
complexity of the problem domain, and that too much knowledge of formal
methods is required to use them effectively. This view of formal methods is
partly responsible for their limited acceptance. While it is true that knowledge
of PROMELA and SPIN must be acquired to use them effectively, by
removing the guesswork from the design process, systems can be designed
more quickly and reliably.
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For experienced users, SPIN is easy to use from the command line or through
the graphical user interface XSPIN. Inexperienced users will benefit more
from using XSPIN, and they can do so with relatively few problems. Most
problems inexperienced users encounter result from using compilation
directives and run-time options. Neither SPIN nor XSPIN do a great job of
optimizing these for performance; this is left to the user. Other than these
minor issues, the simulator and verifier perform well.
This thesis illustrates PROME.I ,A/SPIN's ability to model three different types
of systems hardware circuits, transaction protocols, and communications
protocols. PROMELA/SPIN is best suited for the development of
communications protocols, the area for which it is designed. Chapter 3 shows
that its usefulness for hardware verification is questionable.
The Commit Protocol was successfully verified (see Chapter 6) using
PROMELA/SPIN, but not without difficulty. This is partly due to the nature
of the protocol: It requires transactions to operate. A communications
protocol (see Appendix I) can be modeled as a non-interactive continuous
system, whereas a transaction protocol must have an oracle generate inputs and
monitor output. Even using partial-order reduction methods, the system will
inevitably grow with the size of the input space.
Extensions to PR( )MELA/SPIN make it useful in a greater number of
application domains. Researchers have taken two approaches to extending
PROMELA/SPIN. The first approach targets a specific set of related
concurrent/distributed problems. Both the language and the tool are then
optimized to address the issues in the chosen set. Two examples of this
approach are PROMELA R/T for real-time systems, and PROMELA C/S for
client-server systems.
96
The second approach to extending PROMELA/SPIN attempts to diminish
the effect of state space explosion. The size of the state space is the limiting
factor in model checking, and many methods of dealing with it have been
proposed. One such method that has proven to work well is partial-order
reduction; this is in the version of PROMELA/SPIN used in this thesis.
Another method is state space caching, which reduces memory requirements
by not requiring that all visited states be stored in memory.
While both approaches have advantages, the
second'
approach has few
disadvantages. Reducing the state space explosion effect is generally applicable,
and may be used in collaboration with any specialized implementation of
PROMELA/SPIN. Constraining PROMELA/SPIN to a specific set of
problems requires implementing and maintaining each specialized version,
which would be an overwhelming task.
There are a number of possible projects that can build on this thesis' results.
As more extensions of PROMELA/SPIN become available, they can be
compared and evaluated. Temporal model checking, which is already widely
used commercially for hardware verification, can be investigated. Another
topic would be the translation of verified PROMELA models into a language
such as C++ or Java.
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A. PROMELA RESERVED WORDS
active If this word precedes a proctype definition, then upon
initialization of the system one or more of the corresponding
processes will be instantiated. This is the only way to make
active any other processes than the init process in the initial
system state. All formal parameters of these processes will be
initialized to zero. Two examples follow: the first instantiates a
single process, while the second instantiates two.
Examples: active proctype singleProcess (){...}
active [2] proctype TwoProcesses ( ){...}
assert Correctness claim that checks the validity of its argument
during execution. If the argument evaluates to false (or zero),
then it is reported as an error. The argument can be any
expression that can be evaluated to a single value.
Example. assert ( something == somethingElse )
atomic A non-deterministic sequence of statements that are executed
as one indivisible block. The block (sequence) of statements
can be regarded as a kind of primitive because they cannot be
interleaved with any other processes. This means that no other
process can execute statements from the moment that the
atomic sequence begins to the moment that it completes. The
exception to this, however, is if one of the statements in the
sequence blocks control will be turned over to another
process until that statement becomes executable.
Example. atomic {/ *sequence of statements goes here*/)
bit A basic data type that is used to identify a variable representing
one bit of information which can have a value of 0 or 1.
Example. bit oneBitOf Information
bool A basic data type that is used to identify a variable representing
one bit of information which can have a value of 0 or 1
meaning false or true, respectively.
Example, bool oneBitOflnformation
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break Is a loop termination statement used to jump out of a loop.
When executed, it signals a jump to the end label of the current
loop.
Example, break
byte A basic data type that is used to identify a variable representing
eight bits of information which can have a value between 0 and
255, inclusive.
Example, byte oneByteOf Information
chan Used to indicate that a variable is a channel. A channel is
declared using both an array and a set notation. The brackets
(array notation) encompass a positive integer that specihes the
length of the channel. A channel that is declared with a length
of
'0'
cannot store any messages and is only used for rendez
vous communication. The braces (set notation) encompass the
type(s) that are passed as a single message. If there is more
than one type identifier in the braces, then each message will
contain one value pertaining to each identifier. The examples
below illustrate a rendez-vous channel with messages of type
bit and a channel of length ten messages where each message
contains two integers.
Example. chan rendezvous = [0] of { bit }
chan twolnts = [10] of { int, int }
d_step Indicates a sequence of statements that are executed as one
indivisible block much like atomic sequences. The block of
statements in a d_step sequence, however, must be
deterministic. This means that the sequence of statements
cannot contain any jumps to destinations which are outside of
the d_step sequence and that no statement other than the first
may block. Any non-determinism encountered is resolved by
taking the path with the first true guard.
Example. d_step{/*sequence of statements goes here*/)
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do (od) Represent the beginning and end, respectively, of loop
structures. Each statement (or sequence of statements) in the
loop that is preceded by a double colon represents a path that
can be non-deterministically taken with each iteration. This
provides a built-in case-type statement in the loop structure.
Exiting a loop can be done by either
"jumping"
out of it, or by
using a break statement.
Example, do
/* do something */
/* do something else */
break
od
else Can be used as a guard in either a do construct or an if
construct. It signifies in both cases a sequence that can be
taken only when no other sequences in that (do or if) construct
are executable.
Example. . . .
: : else -:> /*remainder of statement sequence*/
empty A function performed on a channel which, consequently, is
passed as its only argument. If there are no messages in the
channel at the time of execution then the function evaluates to
the boolean value of true, otherwise it will evaluate to false. It
is not side-effect free.
Example. empty ( myChannel )
enabled A function that takes as its only argument a process id (integer).
If the process corresponding to the given process id can
perform an executable operation at the time that this function
is executed, then the function evaluates to the boolean value of
true, otherwise it will evaluate to false. These statements are
restricted to reside in never claims only.
Example. enabled ( myProcessID )
eval A function that takes a variable name as its argument, and casts
its current value to a constant. This way, the value of the
variable can be used to match receive operations.
Example. eval ( aVariable )
103
full A function performed on a channel which, consequently, is
passed as its only argument. If the number of messages in the
channel at the time of execution is equal to the predefined
maximum value then the function evaluates to the boolean
value of true, otherwise it will evaluate to false. It is not side-
effect free.
Example. full ( myChannel )
goto The infamous gotoit is an unconditional jump.
Example. goto aDestination
hidden Declares scratch variables that are write-only. This means drat
they do not carry meaningful values that can be used.
Example. hidden byte myScratchByte
if (fi) Represent the beginning and end, respectively, of selection
structures. Each statement (or sequence of statements) in the
structure that is preceded by a double colon represents a path
that can be non-deterministically taken. A path can only be
taken if the first statement, called a guard, evaluates to true (non
zero).
Example, if
: :
/* do something */
:: / * do something else */
fi
init Used something like main in C and can only be used once. It is
the only process to be instantiated (except for those labeled
with the keyword active) in the initial system state.
Example. init{ run thisProcess ( ); run thatProcess ( ) }
int A basic data type that is used to identify a variable representing
thirty-two bits of information which can have a value between
231
and 231-1, inclusive.
Example. int signedNumber
len A function that takes the label of a channel as its only argument
and returns the number of messages the given channel currently
contains. This function is not side-effect free.
Example. len( criticalChannel )
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mtype Used to declare variables of the basic data type, mtype, which
stands for message type. It is an unsigned quantity having a value
between 0 and 255, inclusive. It is used to abstract from
specific variable names so that they can be interpreted
symbolically.
Example, mtype = { ack , nack }
chan response = [1] of { mtype }
nempty A function performed on a channel which, consequently, is
passed as its only argument. If there are messages in the
channel at the time of execution then the function evaluates to
the boolean value of true, otherwise it will evaluate to false.
This function is side-effect free and will not violate exclusive
access assertions on channels.
Example. nempty ( myChannel )
never A temporal claim that is deemed to be impossible within the
specified system. This means that the temporal claim is used to
specify any illegal behavior in the orderings of the properties of
the states of the system. A never claim can only contain
propositions (conditional expressions) that will not
inadvertendy change the state of the system.
Example. never{/* behavior to look for */}
nfull A function performed on a channel. If the number of
messages in the channel at the time of execution is less than the
predefined maximum value then the function evaluates to the
boolean value of true, otherwise it will evaluate to false. It is
side-effect free and will not violate exclusive access assertions
on channels.
Example. nfull ( myChannel )
of This word is used in the definition of channels see chan.
pc_value A function that takes as its argument a process id and returns
the current state of the process. The state number returned by
the function corresponds to the line number of the PROMELA
source code. .Also, these statements are restricted to reside
inside of never claims.
Example. pc_value( myProcessID )
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printf A statement used to display output just like it is used in C.
Example, printf ( "\nThe result is: %d\n" , result )
priority Used when instantiating processes to specify the priority of the
process. The default priority is 1 and a higher number indicates
that it is N times more likely to execute than a process with a
priority of 1. Can be used with active process also.
Example. proctype MyProcess ( ) {/*define process here*/}
run MyProcess ( ) priority N
active proctype MyProc ( ) { } priority N
proctype Used in the declaration of new process types.
Example. proctype MyProcess () {/* define process here */}
provided Used in the declaration of new process types to specify an
enabling condition. The enabling condition must be side-effect
free.
Example. proctype MyProcess ( ) { } provided (expression)
run Used to spawn new processes.
Example. run MyProcess ( )
short A basic data type that is used to identify a variable representing
sixteen bits of information which can have a value between
and 215-1, inclusive.
Example. short signedNumber
skip A statement that has no effect on the current state of the
system. It is only used as a place holder.
Example. skip
timeout Guards against a deadlocked system state. If there is a process
in the system somewhere that is currendy at a timeout
statement, then the timeout will become executable and
execute if no other statement in the system can. This statement
is especially useful for watchdog timers.
Example. timeout -> * reset something */
typedef Declares user-defined data types similar to struct in C.
Example. typedef myDataType{ bool fieldl; int field2 }
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unless An escape sequence that can change control from a statement
(or set of statements) to another statement (or set of
statements). In the example below the process would loop
forever. However, if the guard C of the escape sequence,
became executable while either A or B were executing, then
control of the process would change and C would execute.
Example, do
: : A -> B
od
unless { C -:> D }
xr The assertion made using this keyword states that the process
that the statement is found in is the only process that will read
from that channel. This is necessary for partial order reduction.
Example. xr myChannel
xs The assertion made using this keyword states that the process
that the statement is found in is the only process that will write
to that channel. This is necessary for partial order reductions.
Example. xs myChannel
This is a predefined scratch (write-only) variable.
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B. PROMELA OPERATORS
Operator Description
+ Addition
- Subtraction
* Multiplication
/ Division
a.
o Modulus
++ Increment
-- Decrement
> Greater-than
>= Greater-than or Equal-to
< Less-than
<= Less-than or Equal-to
== Equal
1 Not Equal
&& Logical .AND
1 1 Logical OR
& Bitwise .AND
1 Bitwise OR
~ Complement
>> Shift Right
7 Receive
77 Random Receive
i Send
i i Sorted Send
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C. SPIN SIMULATION OPTIONS
Option Description
1 Indicates an interactive simulation run.
t Indicates a guided simulation run using a
generated simulation trail.
jN Will skip the first N steps of a guided
simulation run.
nN Sets the seed of the random number
generator to N.
m Loose the messages sent to a full queue.
1 Print the values of all local variables.
g Print the values of all global variables.
s Print all send operations.
r Print all receive operations.
p Print all statements executed.
v Print all warning information available.
d Print a symbol table containing all initial
system information.
V Print the current version of the tool
being used.
f Translate an LTL formula into a never
claim.
a Generate a verifier called pan.c.
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D. SPIN LTL OPERATORS
Operator Description
A Logical AND
ScSc Logical AND
\/ Logical OR
1 1
1
Logical OR
Logical Negation
-> Logical Implication
<-> Logical Equivalence
[] Always
<> Eventually
u Until
V Dual of Until
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E. SPIN COMPILATION DIRECTIVES
BITSTATE Compiles for the Supertrace (bit-state space) -algorithm.
Used for systems that are too large for exhaustive
verification.
CHECK Provides information to be printed out during
verification for debugging. Gives less information than
VERBOSE.
COLLAPSE Can compress the state vector by 90%. Used to save
memory during verifications, but increases the run-time
by 2 or 3 times.
COVEST
CTL
HYBRID HASH
Provides an estimate of coverage for a bit-state space
analysis of the system.
Will only allow for partial-order reduction that is
consistent with branching-time temporal logics.
Saves one byte for every state vector when the state
vector is one byte longer than a multiple of four.
MEMCNT Sets the upper-bound for the maximum allowable
memory to be used for a verification run. This
constrains the tool to RAM.
NFAIR
NIBIS
.Allocates memory for enforcing weak fairness. It is
only used when prompted by the tool.
Used for extra optimization in conjunction with partial-
order reduction.
NOBOUNDCHECK Will not check for violations of array bounds. Used to
perform faster verification runs.
NOCLAIM Disables the use of the never claim for the verification
run.
Ill
NOCOMP Will not compress the state vector. Used to perform
faster verification runs.
NOCOND Disables conditional safety rules for faster verification
runs.
NOFAIR
NOREDUCE
NOSTUTTER
NOVSZ
NP
PEG
PRINTF
REACH
SAFETY
SDUMP
SVDUMP
VAR RANGES
Disables weak-fairness for faster verification runs and
less memory usage.
Disables partial-order reduction for full state space
exploration.
Disables stuttering of the final state of the never claim,
however, it does change the semantics.
Removes the length field, which is four bytes, from the
state vector to save memory. It may invalidate liveness
checks.
Enables a check for non-progress cycles during
verification.
Enables complexity profiling during verification.
Enables printf statements during verification.
Can guarantee the absence of errors within the limit of
the stack. A truncated search cannot always guarantee
the absence errors due to not exploring previously
visited states.
Can be used when not checking for liveness for faster
verifications and less memory usage.
Produces an ascii file at the end of a verification run
that contains the state vectors for all states.
Produces a binary file at the end of a verification run
that contains the state vectors for all states.
Produces the ranges of all variables during a verification
run. It is restricted compute values from 0 to 255.
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VECTORSZ Allocates memory for the state vector.
VERBOSE Provides information for debugging during verification.
XUSAFE Disables validity checks of channel assertions when the
check is too strict.
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F. SPIN VERIFICATION OPTIONS
Option Description
a Search for acceptance cycles.
b Uses backward single-bit hashing.
cN Halts a verification run upon reaching the
N*
error.
d Prints all of the information in the state
tables.
e Saves state trails for all encountered
errors.
f Enforces weak-fairness.
hN Allows a user to choose a list of hash
functions numbering 1 to 32.
i Search for the shortest error trail.
I Faster and approximate search for the
shortest error trail.
1 Search for non-progress cycles.
mN Sets the maximum search depth to N.
n Disables the listing of unreachable states.
q Enforces the requirement of empty
channels in valid end-states.
s Uses forward single-bit hashing.
V Prints the current version of the tool
being used.
wN Sets the size of the hash table to 2lN.
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G. D-LATCH SPECIFICATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Model :
File Name:
Author :
D-Latch
DLatch.pml
Mark Bezdany
(I1&&I2)
= (III 1 12 I 113)
= ! (I1&&I2)
*/
#define INVERTER (I, O) (O != (1-1)) -> 0 = 1-1
#define AND2(I1, 12, 0) (0 != (I1&&I2)) -> 0 =
#define OR3 (11,12,13,0) (0 ! = (II | | 12 I 1 13 ) ) ->0
#define NAND2 (II, 12, O) (0 != !(ll&&12)) -> 0
#define NAND3 (11,12,13,0) (0!= ! (I1&&I2&&I3 ) ).->0= ! (I1&&I2&&I3 )
bit d, en, q, qOld, newlnput ;
proctype DLatchValidO {
bit 11, 12, 13, 14;
do
: : if
INVERTER (en, 11)
AND2(d, q, 12)
AND2(d, en, 13)
AND2(11, q, 14)
OR3(12, 13, 14, q)
fi;
newlnput = 0
od
}
proctype DLatchlnvalidO
bit 11, 12, 13, 14;
do
if
INVERTER (en, 11);
NAND2(d, q, 12);
NAND2(d, en, 13);
NAND2 (11, q, 14) ;
NAND3(12, 13, 14, q) ;
fi;
newlnput = 0
od
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42 proctype Stimulus () {
43 do
44 : : timeout -> atomic { newlnput = 1;
45 qOld = q;
46 if
47 : : d = 1 - d
48 : : en = 1 - en
49 fi >
50 od
51 }
52
53
54 init {
55 newlnput = 1
56 /* Run with one of the two following atomic
57 statements commented out. */
58 /* atomic { run Stimulus () run DLatchlnvalidO } */
59 atomic { run stimulus (); run DLatchValidO }
60 }
61
62
63 never {
64 Top :
65 /* If there has been no new input and the output
66 has changed, then break out of this loop. */
67 do
68 :: ((newlnput == 0) && (qOld != q) ) -:> break
69 : : else -> skip
70 od;
71
72 do
73 /* Conditions haven't changed from previous loop. *,
74 :: ((newlnput == 0) && (qOld != q) )
75
76 /* Still no new input, but output changed again. */
77 :: ((newlnput == 0) && (qOld == q) ) -:> break
78
79 /* Input changed, so restart. */
80 :: (newlnput == 1) -> goto Top
81 od
82 }
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H. ALTERNATING -BIT PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SIMULATION MODEL
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
* Model: Alternating-Bit Protocol (Simulation)
* File Name: FullDuplexAB_S.pml
* Author: Mark Bezdany
*/
#define STOP_AT 3
#define MAX_TIME 7
#define ERR0R_RATE1 256
#define ERROR RATE2 2 56
init {
chan StoM
chan MtoR
chan RtoM
chan MtoS
atomic {
run SenderReceiver (MtoS, StoM, 1) ;
run Medium (StoM, MtoS, RtoM, MtoR)
run SenderReceiver (MtoR, RtoM, 0)
[2] of { bit, bit, byte }
[2] of { bit, bit. byte }
[2] of { bit. bit, byte }
[2] of { bit, bit, byte }
}
}
proctype Medium (chan froml, tol, from2 , to2) {
byte errorByte, tempByte,-
bit tempBitl, tempBit2, looseMsg, badMsg ;
errorByte = 1 ;
Top:
do
: : skip - >
if
:: nempty ( froml ) -> froml?tempBitl, tempBit2, tempByte
:: empty (froml) -> goto Resetl
fi;
if
fi;
(looseMsg == 1) -> goto Reset2
(badMsg == 1) -:> to2 ! tempBitl, tempBit2 , 0
else -> to2 ! tempBitl, tempBit2, tempByte
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44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
Resetl:
looseMsg = 0 ; badMsg = 0
if
(errorByte%ERROR_RATEl==0) -:> looseMsg=l
(errorByte%ERROR_RATEl==0) -:> badMsg = 1
else -:> skip
fi;
if
:: nempty (from2) -:> from2?tempBitl,tempBit2 , tempByte
:: empty (from2) -:> goto Reset2
fi;
if
: : (tempByte ==2 55) -> goto StopMedium
: : else -:> skip
fi;
if
(looseMsg == 1) -:> goto Resetl
(badMsg == 1) -> tol ! tempBitl, tempBit2 , 0
else -:> tol ! tempBitl, tempBit2 , tempByte
fi;
Reset2 :
looseMsg = 0; badMsg = 0;
if
(errorByte%ERROR_RATE2==0) -:> looseMsg=l
(errorByte%ERROR_RATE2==0) -.> badMsg = 1
else -> skip
fi;
errorByte++
od;
StopMedium:
skip
}
118
81 proctype SenderReceiver (chan in, out; bit first) {
82 byte clock, lastMsgln, msgln, msgOut;
83 bit controlln, ackln, controlOut, ackOut;
84 atomic {
85 if
86 :: (first == 1) -:> ackOut = 1; msgOut = 1
87 else -:> controlOut = 1; goto Receive
88 fi
89 },-
90
91 Send:
92 atomic {out ! controlOut , ackOut , msgOut; clock = 0};
93
94 Receive:
95 do
96 :: nempty(in) -:> in?controlIn, ackln,msgln; break
97 empty (in) ->
98 if
99 :: (clock :>= MAX_TIME) -:> goto Send
100 : : else -> clock++
101 fi;
102 od;
103
104 if
105 :: (msgIn==lastMsgIn) -> goto Receive
106 : : else -:> lastMsgln = msgln
107 fi;
108
109 if
((msgln > 0) && (msgln != 255)) -> ackOut = controlln
(msgln == 255) -> out 10,0,255; goto Stop
else - > goto Send
110
111
112
113 fi;
114
115 if
116 :: (ackln == controlOut) -.> controlOut = 1 - controlOut;
117 msgOut++
118 : : else -> goto Send
119 fi;
120
121 if
122 :: (msgOut >= STOP_AT) -> out!0, 0,255
123 : : else - > goto Send
124 fi;
125
126 Stop:
127 skip
128 }
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I. ALTERNATING-BIT PROTOCOL
SPECIFICATION-
VERIFICATION MODEL
1 /*
2 * Model: Alternating-Bit Protocol (Verification)
3 * File Name: FullDuplexAB_V.pml
4 * Author: Mark Bezdany
5 */
6 #define MAX_TIME 7
7 mtype = { GOOD_PACKET, BAD_PACKET };
8
9
10 proctype SenderReceiver (chan in, out; bit first) {
11 byte clock, msgln ;
12 bit controlln, ackln, controlOut, ackOut;
13 xr in,- xs out;
14 if
15 .: (first == 1) -> ackOut = 1
16 :: else -:> controlOut = 1; goto Receive
17 fi;
18
19 Send:
20 atomic {
21 if
22 :: out ! controlOut, ackOut ,GOOD_PACKET; clock=0
23 :. out ! controlOut, ackOut, BAD_PACKET; clock=0
24 : : skip
25 fi;
26 };
27
28 Receive:
29 do
30 - : (clock :>= MAX_TIME) -> goto Send
31 : : else -> clock++
32 od
33 unless { nempty (in) -> in?controlIn, ackln,msgln };
34
35 if
36 : : (ackIn==controlOut && msgIn==GOOD_PACKET) - >
37 controlOut = 1 - controlOut; ackOut = controlln
38 : (ackln! =controlOut && msgIn==GOOD_PACKET) ->
39 ackOut = controlln
40 : : else -> skip
41 fi;
42
43 goto Send
44 }
120
45 init {
46 chan StoR = [1] of { bit, bit, mtype }
47 chan RtoS = [1] of { bit, bit, mtype },-
48 atomic {
49 run SenderReceiver (RtoS, StoR, 1)
50 run SenderReceiver (StoR, RtoS, 0) ;
51 }
52 }
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J. COMMIT PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
* Model: Two-Phase Commit Protocol
* File Name: Commit.pml
* Author: Mark Bezdany
*/
#define MAX_TRANS 2
#define MAXIDATA 2
#define MESSAGE_SIZE 7
#define LOCK_SIZE 3
#define TID_POS 6
#define CH_SZ 1
mtype = { NewTrans, CanCommit, Can, Cant, Abort, DoCommit,
HaveCommited, Commited, Aborted };
typedef dataEntry { bit lockTransID[LOCK_SIZE] };
typedef message { bit dataTransID[MESSAGE_SIZE] },-
chan ClientToCO = [CH_SZ]
chan COToClient = [CH_SZ]
chan COtoWO = [CH_SZ]
chan WOtoCO = [CH_SZ]
chan COtoWl = [CH_SZ]
chan WltoCO = [CH_SZ]
of
of
of
of
of
mtype ,
mtype,
mtype,
mtype ,
mtype.
message
bit
message
message
message
of { mtype, message
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24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
active proctype Client () {
xr COToClient; xs ClientToCO
bit transOutl; bit transOut2 ;
message trans ;
mtype messType;
TransLoop :
progress_Cl :
do
:: atomic { ((transOutl ==0) II (transOut2 == 0) )
if
trans.dataTransID[0] = 1
trans .dataTransID[l] = 1
trans .dataTransID[2] = 1
trans .dataTransID[3] = 1
trans .dataTransID[4] = 1
trans .dataTransID[5] = 1
fi;
- trans . dataTrans ID [ 0 ]
- trans .dataTrans ID [1]
- trans .dataTrans ID [2]
- trans .dataTrans ID [3 ]
- trans.dataTrans ID [4]
- trans.dataTransID[5]
if
( ( (trans .dataTrans ID[0] +trans .dataTransID[l] ) >=1) &&
( (trans .dataTrans ID [2] +trans .dataTrans ID [3] ) >=1) &&
( (trans.dataTransID[4]+trans.dataTransID[5] ) >=1) )
if
: : (transOutl == 0) -:>
trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] = 0;
transOutl = 1
: : (transOut2 == 0) -:>
trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] = 1 ;
transOut2 = 1
fi;
ClientToCO INewTrans , trans
else -:> skip
fi
}
od
unless
{ nempty (COToClient) ->
if
:: COToClient ?messType, 0 -> transOutl =
:: C0ToClient?messType, 1 -:> transOut2 =
fi
};
goto TransLoop ;
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69 active proctype Coordinator ( ) {
70 xr ClientToCO; xs COToClient
71 xr WOtoCO; xs COtoWO;
72 xr WltoCO; xs COtoWl;
73 dataEntry dataTable [MAX_DATA] ;
74 bit phaseTO; bit phaseTl; bit votes [8]; bit abort ;
75 message trans ;
76
77 CoordStart :
78 end_C0:
79 { { atomic { ClientToCO?NewTrans, trans -> goto COHandlel } }
80 unless
81 { (nempty (WOtoCO) || nempty (WltoCO) ) -:>
82 if
83 :: W0toC0?Can, trans -:>
84 if
85 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) -> votes[0] = 1
86 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1) -:> votes[4] = 1
87 fi;
88 :: WltoC0?Can, trans -:>
89 if
90 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) -> votesfl] = 1
91 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1) -:> votes[5] = 1
92 fi;
93 :: WOtoCO?Cant, trans -:>
94 if
95 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) -:>
96 votes [0] = 1; votes [2] = 1
97 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1) ->
98 votes [4] = 1; votes [6] = 1
99 fi;
100 :: WltoC0?Cant, trans ->
101 if
102 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) ->
103 votes [1] = 1; votes [3] = 1
104 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1) ->
105 votes [5] = 1; votes [7] = 1
106 fi;
107 :: W0toC0?HaveCommited, trans ->
108 if
109 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) -> votes[0] = 1
110 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] ==1) -> votes [4] = 1
111 fi;
112 :: WltoCO ?HaveCommited, trans -:>
113 if
114 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) -> votes[l] = 1
115 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] ==1) -> votes [5] = 1
116 fi;
117 fi;
118 goto C0Handle2
119 } };
120 goto CoordStart;
124
121 COHandlel :
122 atomic {
123 if
124 :: ((trans.dataTransIDfO] == 1) &&
125 (dataTable[0] . lockTransID[0] == 1)) ->
126 abort = 1
127 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [1] == 1) &&
128 (dataTable[l] . lockTransID[0] ==1)) -:>
129 abort = 1
130 : : else - > skip
131 fi;
132 if
133 (abort == 0) ->
134 if
135 :: (trans.dataTransIDfO] == 1) ->
136 assert ( dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] == 0 ) ;
137 dataTable[0] .lockTransIDfO] = 1;
138 dataTable[0] . lockTransID[
139 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] = :
140 : : else -> skip
141 fi;
142 if
143 :: (trans. dataTrans ID [1] == 1) ->
144 assert ( dataTablefl] . lockTransIDfO] ==0 ) ;
145 dataTable[l] . lockTransID[0] = 1;
146 dataTable[l] . lockTransID[
147 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] = 1
148 : : else - > skip
149 fi;
150 COtoWO ! CanCommit , trans ;
151 COtoWl! CanCommit, trans
152 : : else - >
153 abort = trans .dataTrans ID [TID_POS] ;
154 COToClient !Aborted, abort ;
155 abort = 0
156 fi;
157 };
158 goto CoordStart;
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160
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163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
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177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
.dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0)&Sc (phaseTO ==
1) && (votes [1] == 1) ) ->
C0Handle2 :
atomic {
if
:: ( (trans. 0)) -:
if
: ( (votes f 0] ==
if
:: ((votes [2] == 1) && (votes [3] == 0)) ->
votes[0]=0; votes [1]=0; votes[2]=0; votes[3]=0;
COtoWl ! Abort , trans
abort = trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS ]
COToClient !Aborted, abort;
abort = 0
:: ((votes [2] == 0) && (votes [3] == 1)) ->
votes [0]=0; votes [1]=0; votes [2] =0; votes [3] =0;
COtoWO ! Abort , trans ;
abort = trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS ] ;
COToClient !Aborted, abort
abort = 0
:: ((votes [2] == 1) && (votes [3] == 1)) -
votes[0]=0; votes [1]=0; votes[2]=0; votes[3]=0;
abort = trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS ] ;
COToClient ;Aborted, abort
abort = 0
((votes [2] == 0) && (votes [3] ==0)) ->
votes [0]=0; votes [1]=0; votes [2] =0; votes [3] =0;
phaseTO = 1;
COtoWO ! DoCommit , trans ;
COtoWl ! DoCommit , trans
fi;
if
: : (dataTable[0] .lockTransIDfl]
dataTablefO] .
dataTable[0] .
dataTable[0] .
else - > skip
lockTransID[0] =
lockTransID[l] =
lockTransID[2] =
== D
0
0
0
fi;
if
(dataTablefl]
dataTable[l] .
dataTable[l] .
dataTablefl] .
else - - skip
.lockTransIDfl]
== 1)
lockTransIDfO] = 0
lockTransIDfl] = 0
lockTransID[2] = 0
fi;
else - : skip
fi
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205 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 0) && (phaseTO == 1)) ->
206 if
207 :: ( (votes fO] == 1) && (votes [1] == 1)) ->
208 votes [0]=0; votes [1]=0; votes [2] =0; votes [3] =0;
209 phaseTO = 0; abort = 0;
210 abort = trans .dataTrans ID [TID_POS]
211 COToClient iCommited, abort
212 . : else -:> skip
213 fi
214 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1) &&(phaseTl ==0)) ->
215 if
216 :: ((votes [4] == 1) && (votes [5] ==1)) ->
217 if
218 :. ((votes [6] ==1) && (votes [7] == 0)) ->
219 votes[4]=0; votes[5]=0; votes[6]=0; votes[~]=0;
220 COtoWl ! Abort , trans ;
221 abort = trans . dataTrans ID [TID_POS] ;
222 COToClient !Aborted, abort ;
223 abort = 0
224 : ((votes [6] ==0) && (votes [7] == 1)) --
225 votes [4] =0; votes [5] =0; votes [ 6] =0; votes [7] =0;
226 COtoWO!Abort, trans ;
227 abort = trans .dataTrans ID [TID_POS]
228 COToClient !Aborted, abort;
229 abort = 0
230 :: ((votes [6] == 1) && (votes [7] == 1)) -:>
231 votes[4]=0; votes[5]=0; votes[6]=0; votes
[~
] =0 ;
232 abort = trans .dataTrans ID [TID_POS] ;
233 COToClient !Aborted, abort;
234 abort = 0
235 .: ((votes [6] == 0) && (votes [7] == 0)) ->
236 votes[4]=0; votes[5]=0; votes[6]=0; votes[~]=0;
237 phaseTl = 1 ;
238 COtoWO! DoCommit, trans
239 COtoWl ! DoCommit, trans
240 fi;
241 if
242 :: (dataTable[0] .lockTransID[2] == 1) ->
243 dataTable[0] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
244 dataTable[0] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
245 dataTablefO] . lockTransID[2] = 0;
246 : else - skip
247 fi;
248 if
249 :: (dataTablefl] . lockTransID[2] == 1) ->
250 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
251 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
252 dataTablefl] .lockTransID [2] = 0;
253 : : else - > skip
254 fi;
255 : : else - > skip
256 fi
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257 :: ( (trans.dataTrans ID [TID_POS] == 1)&& (phaseTl ==1)) -
258 if
259 :: ((votes [4] == 1) && (votes [5] == 1)) ->
260 votes [4] =0; votes [5] =0; votes f 6] =0; votes [7] =0;
261 phaseTl = 0;
262 abort = trans .dataTransID [TID_POS]
263 COToClient iCommited, abort;
264 abort = 0
265 : : else -:> skip
266 fi
267 fi;
268 } ;
269 goto CoordStart
270 }
271
272
273 active proctype W0() {
274 xr COtoWO; xs WOtoCO;
275 dataEntry dataTable [MAX_DATA]
276 message trans
277 bit abort;
278
279 WOStart:
280 end_W0 :
281 {
282 if
C0toW0?CanCommit, trans -> goto WOHandlel
C0toW0?DoCommit, trans -> goto W0Handle2
C0toW0?Abort, trans -:> abort = 1; goto W0Handle2
283
284
285
286 fi
287 }
288 goto WOStart;
289
290 WOHandlel :
291 atomic {
292 if
293 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [2] == 1) &&
294 (dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] == 1)) -:
295 abort = 1
296 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [3] == 1) &&
297 (dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] == 1)) -:
298 abort = 1
299 : : else - > skip
300 fi;
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302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
if
: : (abort == 0) -:>
if
:: (trans.dataTransIDfO + MAXIDATA] == 1) -:>
assert( dataTablefO] . lockTransIDfO] ==0 );
dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] = 1;
dataTablefO] . lockTransIDf
(trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] =1
: : else - > skip
fi;
if
:: (trans. dataTrans ID [1 + MAX_DATA] == 1) ->
assert( dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] == 0 );
dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] = 1;
dataTablefl] .lockTransIDf
(trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] =1
: : else -:> skip
fi;
WOtoCO ! Can , trans
.. else -> abort = 0; WOtoCO ! Cant , trans
fi;
};
goto WOStart ;
W0Handle2 :
atomic {
if
:: (dataTablefO] .lockTransIDf
(trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] == 1) -.:
dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
dataTablefO] .lockTransID [2] = 0;
- else - > skip
fi;
if
: : (dataTablefl] .lockTransIDf
(trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] == 1)
dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
dataTablefl] .lockTransID [2] = 0;
: : else -> skip
fi;
if
:: (abort == 0) -> WOtoCO IHaveCommited, trans
: : else - > skip
fi;
abort = 0
};
goto WOStart
}
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351 active proctype Wl() {
352 xr COtoWl; xs WltoCO;
353 dataEntry dataTable [MAX_DATA] ;
354 message trans;
355 bit abort;
356
357 Wistart:
358 end_Wl :
359 {
360 if
361 : : COtoWl?CanCommit, trans -> goto WlHandlel
362 COtoWl ?DoCommit, trans -:> goto WlHandle2
363 : COtoWl ?Abort, trans -:> abort = 1; goto WlHandle2
364 fi
365 } ;
366 goto WIStart;
367
368 WlHandlel :
369 atomic {
370 if
371 :: ( (trans. dataTrans ID [4] == 1) &&
372 (dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] == 1)) ->
373 abort = 1
374 :: ( (trans.dataTransID[5] == 1) &&
375 (dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] == 1)) ->
376 abort = 1
377 : : else - > skip
378 fi;
379 if
380 : : (abort == 0) ->
381 if
382 .: (trans.dataTransID[4] == 1) -:>
383 assert ( dataTablefO] . lockTransIDfO] ==0 ),-
384 dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] = 1;
385 dataTablefO] .lockTransIDf
386 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] + 1)]
387 : : else - > skip
388 fi;
389 if
390 :: (trans.dataTransID[5] == 1) -:>
391 assert! dataTablefl] . lockTransIDfO] ==0 ),-
392 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] = 1;
393 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDf
394 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] + 1) ]
395 : : else -:> skip
396 fi;
397 WltoCO!Can, trans
398 :: else -:> abort = 0; WltoCO !Cant, trans
399 fi;
400 } ;
401 goto WIStart;
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402 WlHandle2 :
403 atomic {
404 if
405 :: (dataTablefO] .lockTransIDf
406 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] +1)] ==1) -
407 dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
408 dataTablefO] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
409 dataTablefO] .lockTransIDf 2] = 0;
410 : - else - > skip
411 fi;
412 if
413 :: (dataTablefl] .lockTransIDf
414 (trans. dataTrans ID [TID_POS] + 1)]
415 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfO] = 0;
416 dataTablefl] .lockTransIDfl] = 0;
417 dataTablefl] .lockTransID [2] = 0;
418 : : else -> skip
419 fi;
420 if
421 :: (abort ==0) -> WltoCO !HaveCommited, trans
422 : : else - > skip
423 fi;
424 abort = 0
425 } ;
426 goto WIStart
427 }
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